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Abstract
The so-called second Bergier report offers a wealth of information as well as some useful and valuable
analytical insights, but it also suffers from a number of shortcomings and weaknesses, some of which
are quite serious. The significance of important facts is not worked out properly. The abundant numeri-
cal data remain unexploited. The analysis is often repetitious and sometimes inconsistent. Many inter-
pretations are far-fetched. The general image of Switzerland's refugee policy it paints is difficult to
reconcile with several central facts. Its severe judgements therefore seem to rest on fragile foundations.
For all these reasons, a very different and, in part, a novel analysis of Switzerland's policy and practice
vis-à-vis the refugees is proposed in a constructive spirit, an analysis that seems fully corroborated by
the available information and numerical data.
Résumé
Le deuxième Rapport Bergier offre une information fort riche ainsi que des apports analytiques qui sont
utiles et valables, mais il comporte aussi des faiblesses et lacunes dont certaines sont graves. Des faits
d'importance ne sont pas mis en valeur de manière appropriée. Les nombreuses données chiffrées qu'il
contient ne sont malheureusement pas exploitées. L’analyse est souvent répétitive, avec des contradic-
tions internes. Plusieurs interprétations sont tirées par les cheveux. L’image générale que le Rapport
brosse de la politique suisse envers les réfugiés n’est guère conciliable avec des faits centraux. Les
sévères jugements qu’il porte sur cette politique reposent donc sur des bases qui paraissent fragiles.
Pour toutes ces raisons, une analyse très différente de la politique et de la pratique envers les réfugiés
est proposée dans un esprit constructif. Cette analyse, qui est en partie nouvelle, paraît pleinement
corroborée par l'information disponible, chiffrée ou non.
Zusammenfassung
Der zweite Bergier Bericht enthält zwar eine Fülle Informationsmaterial sowie einige gute Ansätze,
leidet aber auch unter einer Reihe z.T. gravierender Schwächen und Versäumnissen. Die Bedeutung
wichtiger Fakten wird nicht ausreichend herausgearbeitet und das ausgiebige Zahlen- und  Datenmate-
rial  wird  leider kaum ausgewertet.  Die Analyse  tendiert zur  Wiederholung und ist manchmal
zusammenhangslos. Viele Auslegungen sind weit hergeholt. Das vom Bericht gezeichnete Bild der
Schweizer Flüchtlingspolitik ist mit vielen zentralen Fakten kaum in Einklang zu bringen. Die Aburtei-
lungen dieser Politik scheinen deshalb auf wackeligen Füßen zu stehen. Aus allen diesen Gründen wird
konstruktiv eine grundsätzlich andere und z.T. neue Analyse der Schweizer Flüchtlingspolitik und
Praxis vorgeschlagen,  die allem  Anschein nach  mit  den  verfügbaren  Informationen und  Daten
vollkommen konsistent ist.
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1
As a subject matter of history, this human world should be studied in the same manner as
physical realities. We must observe it, deduce, link our findings by provisional hypothe-
ses, experiment, and look for laws. We historians must adopt a scientific approach, just
like physicists: observe dispassionately, reach conclusions without preconceptions, and
forget our passions, calculations, moral and social positions. Historians should not judge
but understand and explain. We no longer want to hear about the Court of history, with a
capital C.                                                                               Fernand Braudel (1902-1985)
2
As many have noted since its publication, the so-called second Bergier report
3 adds nothing
particularly new, in terms of facts or knowledge, to our previous understanding of the general
issue of refugees in Switzerland during World War II.
4 It does however provide a certain num-
ber of useful, valuable and interesting contributions, which I shall discuss first. I will then try to
underscore its many weaknesses and shortcomings.
First useful contribution: the trains of deportees
Some of the report's contributions are particularly helpful because they provide apparently
definitive answers to questions that, until now, remained controversial or vague. One such con-
tribution is Gilles Forster's annexed study on The Transit of People by Rail through Switzerland
during the Second World War. This work convincingly demonstrates that convoys of deportees
on their way to the death camps, from Italy in particular, did not cross Switzerland but used
other railway lines (farther east in the case of Italy
5). Geography alone would have led to this
conclusion: a quick glance at a railway map of Continental Europe
6 shows that the most direct
routes to the camps in Poland did not cross Switzerland.
                        
1 University of Lausanne, DEEP/HEC, BSFH1, Ch-1015 Lausanne. Email: jean-christian.lambelet@hec.unil.ch.
The original French text is available on the author’s web site: http://www.hec.unil.ch/jlambelet/doc.htlm.#article.
Switzerland’s policy vis-à-vis the refugees during World War II is also discussed in chapter four of my recent
book: Le mobbing d'un petit pays – Onze thèses sur la Suisse pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Lausanne,
L'Âge d'Homme, 1999. I would like to thank all those, too numerous to name here, who generously contributed
their criticism, advice and help. – Particularly relevant contributions are mentioned as they come up in the text.
2 See Les ambitions de l’histoire, R. de Ayala and P. Braudel (Eds.), Paris, Editions de Fallois, 1997, p. 53 (italics
as in original). Special thanks to Jean Freymond who brought this relevant quote to my attention.
3 The Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World War, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi
Era, Bern, 1999, 358 pp., with four annexed reports. The French version is used throughout, including for page
numbers. There are a number of non-trivial differences between the French, German and English versions; in such
cases the first was consistently drawn upon.
4 The press release concurs: “What new elements are we contributing to this issue? People who were persecuted by
Nazism are at the centre of our report (...) Based on individual case studies, we are presenting previously unpub-
lished information.”
5 “I have traced the itinerary for 40 of the convoys from Italy.  They did not cross Switzerland. I have every reason
to believe that the three remaining convoys also crossed the Alps through [passes to the east of Switzerland]” (as
per abstract in the press release). The same was true of convoys from France and elsewhere.
6 For example, that in Mr. Forster’s study, p. 30.4
It is the TV film, Nazi Gold and Jewish Wealth, co-produced by the BBC and the Swiss Ger-
man-language television network,
7 and broadcast around the world, that has most contributed to
the legend of a Switzerland that let convoys of deportees pass through its territory. Unfortu-
nately, this legend will probably remain ingrained for quite a long time in many segments of
Swiss and foreign public opinion. Forster's conscientious and scientific work did not have, and
in the long term may never have, the same impact as that film.
8
This illustrates a general problem created by the re-interpretation of Swiss history in recent
years: once new myths have been implanted in the public’s mind, it becomes extremely difficult
to eradicate these idées reçues
9, even if they are in complete contradiction with known facts.
The only hope is that with the passage of time and of generations, a clearer, more objective
image will take hold. This should not however keep us from working toward setting the record
straight, starting right now.
Second useful contribution: the legal angle
Professor Walter Kälin's annexed study is another of the report's useful contributions. This
professional brief effectively demonstrates that Swiss refugee policy was in agreement with
contemporary Swiss and international positive law, except on a few minor points.
10
In those days, the laws of numerous European states, as well as Swiss law, only granted protec-
tion or a particular status to political refugees: in other words to those who were in danger in
their home countries due to political activities considered to be illicit.  However, fugitives from
religious or racial persecution, notably the Jews, did not fit this criterion and therefore were not
covered by contemporary asylum laws.
The majority of international agreements at the time did not prohibit outright border rejections,
as only those refugees who had managed to reach the interior of the country were to have a right
to remain there. The general interdiction of outright border rejections was not recognised by
international law until later. Also, measures such as requiring refugees in Switzerland to relin-
quish their valuables as well as the legal system applied to internees in Swiss refugee camps
were, in general if not completely, in line with contemporary national and international law.
                        
7 In the credits of the version shown in summer 1997 on the Swiss German-language first TV network (SF1), we
find the following:  “Ein Film von Christopher Olgiati - Mitarbeit Thomas Buomberger”. Mr. Buomberger works
for SF1.
8 Mr. Forster’s report confirms what was already known (e.g. see R. Ochsner’s work) regarding the approximately
300,000 Italians who crossed Switzerland between April 1941 and July 1943 on their way to work in Germany.
However, among new insights, we find that (1) contrary to the hasty judgements of some journalists and historians
(e.g. see the recent book by H.-U. Jost, Politik und Wirtschaft im Krieg, p.104), those transported cannot be re-
garded as forced labourers as they were mostly lured by higher German wages; (2) Swiss authorities put an end to
this transit traffic in July 1943, i.e. at the fall of Mussolini (Ochsner mentions a final train in September); and (3) it
is possible that Italian military personnel, dressed in civilian clothes, took advantage of these convoys to join
Italian forces fighting in Russia - but how many were there? (Identity checks were somewhat more lax for these
convoys than for regular train traffic).
9 I.e. items of conventional wisdom.
10 For example, Mr. Kälin notes that the “solidarity tax”, which was levied on wealthier refugees, conflicted with a
number of treaties on residence rights.5
Regarding the “J” stamp, W. Kälin finally establishes that entry restrictions imposed on German
Jews did not constitute, according to the criteria of the time, a discriminatory practice in the
eyes of constitutional law. They did however conflict with the German-Swiss residence treaty.
On the whole, the “J” stamp requirement should be seen as belonging to a legal “grey zone”.
11
For a lawful state such as Switzerland, both then and now, all this is of great importance. It
would be one thing to conclude, as many have done, that Switzerland could have admitted a
larger number of refugees and that the official policy pronouncements were too harsh (except
near the end of the war), or that a sustained and general movement of solidarity toward the
refugees never took hold. It would however be quite another thing if we had to conclude that
Swiss refugee policy actually violated contemporary national and international law. This was
clearly not the case.
Other useful contributions
The report's detailed description and analysis of the generally admirable actions by a host of
Swiss private relief organisations dedicated to helping the refugees constitute yet another useful
and welcome contribution.
12
One can also find, scattered throughout the text, a certain number of more specific factual ele-
ments that are equally interesting and relevant. For example:
(...) One part of the [Swiss Federal] administration viewed the Jewish refugees as victims of
political persecution.
13
This statement is important because everybody always mentions the case of Heinrich Roth-
mund
14 on account of his legalistic mentality and his anti-Semitism, but the other ranking offi-
cials of that time who were neither legalistic nor anti-Semitic generally remain unrecognised.
15
                        
11 According to W. Kälin, the real problem was Germany’s insistence on a clause reserving the right to require a
“J” stamp in the passports of Swiss Jews. Fortunately, the Reich never acted upon this clause.
12 See section 2.3, pp. 59-71
13 P.5 of the report; also see G. Koller "Entscheidungen über Leben und Tod – Die behördliche Praxis in der
schweizerischen Flüchtlingspolitik während des Zweiten Weltkrieges", Federal Archives, Etudes et sources,
22/1996, pp. 17-106; cf. pp. 27-9 and passim.
14 Head of the Federal Police Division during the war and, as such, a key figure in Switzerland’s official policy
toward the refugees.
15Rothmund’s emblematic anti-Semitism should in any case be toned down somewhat. See e.g. a detailed article by
Heinz Roschewski, "Heinrich Rothmund in seinen persönlichen Akten", in Federal Archives, Etudes et sources,
22/1996, pp. 107 et seq.; and also G. Koller, op.cit., pp. 26-7. That Rothmund’s anti-Semitism should be toned
down will also be apparent to all those who have read the long letter of protest, dated February 19, 1941, sent by
Rothmund to a Lieutenant-Colonel Mullener, then head of Armée et Foyer [ a Swiss army organisation, the aim of
which was to bolster the ranks’ morale] . The letter had to do with Mullener’s official outline of a third general “pep
talk”. The final paragraph of this outline, dated December 28, 1940, discussed the “Jewish problem” in overtly
anti-Semitic terms: “(...) Jews cannot be assimilated, and that has been so for the two thousand years of their dis-
persion. These people have been unable to settle in any place or to integrate into any social whole”. Rothmund
begins his letter in a defensive manner, because he was writing to an important official who was obviously anti-
Semitic, by stating that no one had fought more than he against the Verjudung (“enjewishment”) of Switzerland – it
is words like these that have earned him his present-day reputation. However, he continues by vigorously defending
Switzerland’s Jews and siding with the leaders of the Swiss Jewish community who had been utterly dismayed by
said discussion outline. For Rothmund, the problem was not the Jews in general, but those he described as6
However, such references to the evident diversity of attitudes and opinions on the part of both
higher and lower Swiss officials are rare in the main body of the report. This particular example
is only mentioned in passing and the whole issue is not analysed systematically.
One should further mention the role, illustrated in the report, of several individuals, in particular
numerous civil servants of varying ranks (not only Grüninger…
16) who, acting in a personal
capacity, helped the refugees and successfully obtained entry for a large number of them.
17
In spite of all of these useful and interesting additions to our knowledge of the subject matter,
the main body of the report suffers, in my opinion, from numerous weaknesses and shortcom-
ings – some of which should be considered quite serious. I will attempt to prove this by first
looking at the manner in which the report deals with two issues that it considers fundamental.
Or, as the authors put it,
18 the two “essential moments” in Switzerland’s wartime asylum policy:
(1) the closing of the border in August 1942;  and
(2) the “J” Stamp affair.
I concur with the report that these are two important episodes in Switzerland’s refugee policy
during the last world war. My criticism will therefore be constructive, in the sense that I will not
limit myself to trying to refute the interpretations found in the report, but shall put forward
alternative ones. I shall do likewise with all the other issues to be examined as well as with the
whole of Switzerland’s policy and practice toward refugees during World War II.
As with any scientifically oriented study, the Bergier Commission's reports – this second on the
refugees as well as the first on the gold transactions of the Swiss National Bank – deserve to be
examined thoroughly so as to both underline their positive aspects and point out their possible
deficiencies, weaknesses and distortions.
19 However, despite the Commission’s generous budg-
etary funding and the circumstances surrounding its creation, these reports are neither beyond
debate nor definitive findings.  They are contributions to our knowledge and understanding of a
difficult period in Switzerland’s history. The Commission itself is well aware of this, and its
president has stated on several occasions that he hoped these reports would lead to a
“ lively debate”. The present critical evaluation seeks to contribute to this desired debate, which
should remain scientific above all and therefore dispassionate, or so it is to be hoped.
Finally, note that the present critical evaluation relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the large
amount of data and other material found in the report itself. This also explains how this work
could be brought to completion in a relatively short time.
                                                                            
“unassimilated” or “unable to be assimilated”, i.e. the “Eastern Jews” (Ostjuden). See L. Mysyrowicz, Le Dr
Rothmund et le problème juif (février 1941), Univ. of Geneva, N.D.; this paper can be found at:
http://www.unige.ch/lettres/istsge/mysy/rothmund.html.
16 Paul Grüninger was the chief of police in the Canton of Saint-Gallen  till his dismissal in 1939. Acting way
beyond his official powers, for which he was condemned by a court in 1940, he helped more than 2,000 Jewish
refugees gain admittance in Switzerland, and he has become something of a symbol today.
17 In particular, see section 4.2.3, pp. 126 et seq.
18 P. 2 of the press release.
19 For several critical analyses of the first Bergier report, see my web site.7
1. The Closing of the Border in August 1942
20
Paradoxically, real-life situations are best described by statistics, for
the latter abstract from the habitually cited examples that shock, but are
most often exceptions. Statistics allow for the most reliable separation
of the general from the particular.
                        
20 This section was the subject of an article published in the March 2000, issue of the Schweizer Monatshefte. This
article can be downloaded (in French and German) from the author’s web site – see note 1.8
André Lasserre
21
The impression imparted by the report
On several occasions, the report harshly criticises the official decision, announced on August
13, 1942,
22  to seal the borders to all refugees. One quote may suffice:
(…) Starting in 1942 when the Nazi mass murder policy was in full operation, deportations
from France had begun, and Vichy France had been occupied, Switzerland remained the last
hope for those able to reach its borders. It is in such a context that Switzerland closed its bor-
ders, leaving thousands of refugees to their fate.
23 
This and several other passages in the report will certainly leave the hurried or uniformed reader
with the impression that Switzerland’s borders were indeed hermetically closed, and that they
stayed closed for quite a long time. No doubt, most people would consider this heinous. This
assertion was also largely disseminated by the mass media. But, what are the actual facts?
The facts
Graph 1 shows the monthly figures of civilian refugees admitted into Switzerland from January
1941 to April 1943. These figures, taken from the report,
24 are accepted by all.
25 From this
graph we can see that in the months following the “closing” of the border there actually was a
very large increase in the number of refugees admitted. This is obviously inconsistent with the
idea of a frontier hermetically sealed over a long period. So, what really happened?
                        
21 A Swiss historian referring to refugee policy in:
 Frontières et camps – Le refuge en Suisse de 1933 à 1945,
Lausanne, 1995, p. 8 (italics as in original); also quoted by Koller, op.cit., p. 85.
22 P. 90.
23 P.15.
24 See table on page 24.
25 However, they cover only so-called illegal civilian refugees (i.e. those without the necessary entry papers) who,
as the report puts it, were “interned” [registered?] as such by the Federal Department of Justice and Police. These
statistics exclude all military personnel (approximately 104,000 were admitted during the entire war) as well as
civilian “emigrants” and all others who had the appropriate entry documents, short-term refugees from regions in
the immediate vicinity of the border, and draft dodgers (i.e. civilians who were considered to be military refugees).
As for clandestine refugees (those not announced to the authorities), their numbers are, for obvious reasons, un-
known. See the report, pp.154-5, for some information on this subject. It seems reasonable to suppose that primar-
ily leftist, especially far-left, circles aided clandestine refugees. However, according to information from André
Lasserre (based on an unpublished work by Henry Spira), there existed “Jewish [Zionist?] organisations specialised
in clandestine emigration”. (Special thanks to André Lasserre for contributing this information). Finally, these
statistics ignore several other population movements, such as foreign children on a three-month stay (approx.
60,000), or the persons transiting to other areas of their own country (approx. 66,000), including particularly
Alsatians (more than 1,500 from 1941 to July 1942) who crossed Switzerland to escape from the forced
“Germanization” of their province. In addition, the French collapse in May-June 1940 caused an upsurge in the
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A decision that was quickly and strongly attenuated, if not completely reversed
As stated in the report, the decision to close the borders as announced on August 13, 1942,
caused a widespread outcry in the country:
[ Relief organisations]  demanded a meeting with Rothmund. It took place on August 24. Fol-
lowing a “partially stormy session”, [ the parties reached a compromise]  that was published in
the press. It stipulated that refugees who had entered before August 13 had the right to a
“detailed review” of their personal case; only those applicants considered “undesirable for seri-
ous reasons” would be turned back
26 (...) When the authorities backed down before the protests
of the public and the relief organisations, they were hoping that the number of refugees seeking
admission into Switzerland would subside. The opposite occurred during the last months of
1942.
27
Despite press censorship, the decision to close the borders also gave rise to a “violent debate” in
Swiss newspapers – at least in those examined in the report's third annexed study
28 (also quite
useful and original), and it was “the first time that the authorities’ freedom of action was ques-
tioned”.
29  In fact, there was such a strong wave of protest that the authorities were obliged to
backtrack, beginning around August 23.
Thus, the official and allegedly hermetic border sealing lasted all of ten days – if that (see be-
low). The Federal Councillor
30 primarily concerned by this matter (von Steiger) felt it necessary
to hold a press conference to calm ruffled spirits and justify himself; and the Lower House of
the Swiss Parliament had to be convened during war time – i.e. at a time of reduced parliamen-
tary activity, full powers having been given to the executive branch for the duration – in order to
discuss the situation thanks to a special session in September.
31 All this effectively proves that
                        
26 On page 93 of the report we read: “Over the next few days, these entreaties would lead to an easing of the meas-
ures: the closing of the border would be less strict”.
27 Pp. 67-8. Also see pp. 91-92, and p.32: “In the end, public protest caused by the border closing of August 13,
1942, resulted in a temporary relaxation of the rules and it had a [positive] impact on the issuance of entry per-
mits”.
28 See p. 48 of the annexed study entitled Public Debate on Swiss Refugee Policy from 1938 to 1947 by K. Imhof,
P. Ettinger and B. Boller.
29 According to a recent retrospective study of the Swiss newsreels of the period, “it is surprising to see the rela-
tively high number of reports dealing with refugees”; NZZ, December 16, 1999.
30 Swiss parlance for “Federal Minister”.
31 P. 98 of the report: “(...) The summer of 1942 can be seen as a turning point in the attitude of the Swiss authori-
ties. The plentiful information, the lively debate in Switzerland itself, and the pressures brought to bear by interna-
tional organisations and the allied governments all encouraged the Swiss leaders to be more attentive and take a10
there indeed was a “wave of protest” (Carl Ludwig), the importance of which should not be
minimised in retrospect.
32 It is also important to underline that all of this occurred at the most
crucial moment for Jewish refugees.
The report provides other interesting insights into the reactions elicited by the decision to close
the border.
Surprised by the vehemence of these protests, Federal Councillor von Steiger ordered officials
to “refrain altogether from expulsion in some specific cases” (...) A short time later, von Steiger
informally told the Geneva authorities that until the protests had died down, they were not to
expel any Jewish refugees, and that no one was to be turned over directly to the Germans. From
then on, the Geneva authorities by and large no longer applied the regulations of August 13,
1942.
33
A large number of refugees were admitted
The following conclusion is therefore irrefutable: if we concentrate on the actual course of
events, and not or not only on the pronouncements, intentions and “theoretical” decisions of the
authorities,
34 and if we look beyond the official policy documents and all that can be found in
the archives, it is clear that in the summer and fall of 1942, i.e. after the decision to “close” the
borders, Switzerland actually admitted a number of refugees comparable only to the wave fol-
lowing the Austrian annexation in 1938.
35
Graph 2 below indicates the monthly number of refugees admitted during the whole of the
war.
36 We can see that there were four major waves of entries into Switzerland: (1) in the sum-
mer-fall of 1942; (2) in the late summer and fall of 1943, following the Italian surrender and the
occupation of the Peninsula by German forces; (3) in the summer-fall of 1944, when the fight-
                                                                            
more active stance toward the persecutions”. Of course, the summer of 1942 was the most crucial moment in regard
to the Swiss authorities’ practice toward refugees because, at this point, the “final solution” was being put into
operation in both neighbouring and nearby countries (France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg). However, in
other sections, the report pushes back this “turning point” to the end of 1942: “At the end of 1942, refugee policies
hesitantly began to change” (p. 15).
32 This wave of protest was most definitely an expression of solidarity towards the refugees. Some have qualified it
as short-lived. However, the success (described as “prodigious” by the report) of a subsequent public collection by
the Central Office for Refugee Aid’s contradicts these views. In November 1942, 1.5 million francs were collected
(i.e. 7.2 million francs of today when adjusted for inflation, or 40 million if we take income growth into considera-
tion; the latter figure is the highest ever recorded for any public collection, up to present day).
33 P.143; italics mine. I will come back to the Geneva issue and how it is presented in the report.
34 Here and below, I use the terms “theoretical” and “theory” in their common and negative meaning, i.e. as op-
posed to “reality”. This opposition is of course artificial: as any scientist is aware, reality can only be grasped
through the use of one or more theories (models).
35 To illustrate the impression imparted by the report on this point, here is how even someone as informed as André
Gavillet, a well-known Swiss politician and writer, reacted: “[The report does not provide any fundamentally new
data on, among other points,] the border closing of August 1942, which was modified a month later for “extremely
dire” cases and which became more flexible in September 1943»; Domaine Public, December 18, 1999, p. 3. Ten
days thus become a month, or even a year (August 1942 - September 1943). Reality, i.e. the actual practice toward
refugees, remains ignored although the report provides all the necessary data, but without interpretation.
36 Or, more precisely, from the beginning of 1941; before this date the numbers were either zero or too small to
show up in a chart.11
ing moved close to Switzerland; and finally (4) at the very end of the war. This graph demon-
strates that, in all four cases, Switzerland opened its borders to a large number of refugees.
However...
The question could however be raised as to how many asylum-seeking refugees were turned
away. In other words: to what extent did the country open its borders? Or equivalently, to what
extent did they remain closed?
This question raises another one, much more fundamental, i.e.: What was the most pressing and
vital issue in the mind of the typical asylum candidate who had managed to reach the frontier (a
feat that was often far from easy, inexpensive or risk-free)? Surely it was his/her chances of
being admitted,
37 or in other words his/her admission probabilities. This issue was crucial for
many refugees in general, but even more so for the Jews fleeing persecution and seeking refuge
in Switzerland at the time when, in the summer of 1942, the “final solution” was beginning to
be implemented in neighbouring, or nearby, occupied territories, including France’s so-called
free zone (Vichy).
Data on rejections and on those rejected
In order to discuss admission chances with a modicum of rigor, one must know not only the
number of refugees admitted but also the number of those who were turned back; i.e. when
added together, the total number of asylum-seeking refugees who arrived at the frontier. In this
context, it is essential to distinguish between, on the one hand, the number of rejections and, on
the other hand, the number of people rejected, as they are two distinct concepts. Thus, among
the number of registered rejections, a refugee who was turned back on two different occasions
would count for two units, but he/she should only count as one unit in the number of individuals
who were turned away.
                        
37 Leopold Lintberg’s famous and poignant movie, The Last Chance, shows just how crucial this issue was for
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On the subject of rejections, the report says the following:
There is proof that there were about 24,500 border rejections between January 1940 and May
1945. The actual figure is probably somewhat higher, but a more exact calculation is not possi-
ble because of gaps in the sources.
38,39
While the report accurately refers to a lower limit, i.e. to an underestimation of the actual num-
ber of rejections for various reasons,
40 it unfortunately does not mention the overestimation of
the number of people rejected due to the fact that many asylum candidates attempted to enter
Switzerland more than once, at different points of the frontier and at various intervals of time.
These people therefore were counted more than once in the number of rejections.
In this respect, another helpful contribution from the report is that multiple entry attempts ap-
pear very frequently in the individual cases it examines – up to five attempts and more in some
cases.
41 Multiple attempts were obviously a common occurrence: possibly the rule rather than
the exception for those who were not admitted on their first try.
Under– or overestimation?
Serge Klarsfeld
42 recently stated that he believed the number of rejections to be largely overes-
timated because, if there had been so many at the frontier with France, traces thereof should be
found in the archives of the French camps he scrutinised, which is not the case.
43
The general reaction to the number put forth by Mr. Klarsfeld (5,000 rejections instead of
24,500) was that it was much too low. However, as I will demonstrate below, his calculations
are probably accurate. The source of the misunderstanding is most likely that Serge Klarsfeld
did not explicitly point out the need to distinguish between the total number of rejections, in-
cluding refugees who made multiple entry attempts, and the smaller number of definitive rejec-
tions (those refugees who were never admitted), a point generally missed by his critics too. It is
however quite unlikely that all of those definitively rejected were arrested on the other side of
the border, to be then sent to the French camps and registered in the archives referred to by Mr.
Klarsfeld.
A missed opportunity
According to the press, Mr. Klarsfeld stated that
44
                        
38 P.21; italics added. This number should be increased a little because new evidence of rejections in 1940 and
1941 has recently turned up. The adjustment is however very minor. (Information communicated by Mr. Guido
Koller, Federal Archives, on January 20, 2000).
39 Whereas the French-language version of the report speaks here of some 24,500 “rejections” (refoulements), the
English-language one says that “there is proof that about 24,500 refugees were turned away”. This is typical of the
near-universal confusion between attempts and people.
40 Some of the archives no longer exist; not all of the rejections were registered. See p.132 of the report.
41 See pp.101, 123, 141 (“We have been turning back refugees who previously had tried to enter the country five
times, at various points along the border”), 147, 148 (2x) and 153 (2x). The various accounts collected by Ken
Newman also often mention multiple entry attempts (see his Swiss Wartime Work Camps, NZZ Verlag, 1999).
42 A French lawyer and president of the Association of  The Sons and Daughters of Deported French Jews.
43 See Le Temps, December 16 and 17, 1999.
44 See the December 17, 1999, issue of Le Temps, p.10.13
The number of rejections should have been at the very centre of the Commission's investiga-
tions. I note that this work was not done, which is disappointing. If the Swiss archives are in-
complete, why didn't the researchers consult the French archives? [ The journalist continues: ]
Serge Klarsfeld ended by saying that he himself had been willing to do this research [ but was
not asked to] .
45
On the assumption that this statement attributed to Serge Klarsfeld was accurately reported, it is
indeed unfortunate that the Commission did not deem it necessary to entrust him with this re-
search, or to do the work itself. For the rejections issue is much more central to the report than
another issue, which the Commission researched extensively and which is the object of yet
another annexed study: Switzerland and German Ransom Demands in Occupied Holland.
While this work is interesting in itself, it is of only peripheral importance to the report’s objec-
tives
46 and therefore I will not go into it any further at this point.
More on the rejections data
The report’s figure of 24,500 rejections (24,398 to be exact) is taken from previous research by
Guido Koller.
47 This figure can be broken down into two categories, i.e. as of today: 9,703
rejected candidates who can be identified by name (or by some other means), and 14,695
anonymous rejections. The latter figure most likely includes a number of military personnel
who cannot be identified as such today.
48 This means that when we calculate below the rates or
probabilities of rejection for civilian asylum candidates, they will be overestimated. Symmetri-
cally, the rates or probabilities of admittance will be underestimated.
There were rejections and … rejections
Literature, press, cinema and TV have all created an image of border rejections in which perse-
cuted refugees were arrested at the frontier or forcefully brought back to it, to be directly deliv-
ered into the hands of French, Italian or – worse – German border guards, thereby sealing their
horrible fate. Unfortunately, some cases like this did indeed occur,
49 but they were not repre-
                        
45 It should be noted that the French archives are not the only ones that have not been examined in this context. As
Pierre Goetschin, Professor emeritus at HEC/UNIL, has informed me shortly before his untimely death, the Ger-
man police and bureaucratic infrastructure in France most likely included several civil servants responsible for
gathering all sorts of data and statistics. It is therefore probable that the German archives also contain interesting
and unexploited information.
46 As confirmed by the abstract of this annexed study (p. 352): “Swiss foreign and refugee policies were only
indirectly influenced by German ransom demands” (italics supplied).
47 Op. cit.; for a general criticism of Koller’s figures, see my more recent study mentioned in note 61 below.
48 As Guido Koller has kindly confirmed. I should point out that, contrary to what one often reads, the Hague
conventions and in particular Convention V (1907) did not guarantee a right to asylum for military personnel, but
only the obligation to intern them and provide for them if they reached the territory of a non-belligerent state.
However, following incidents such as the episode of the “Bourbakis” in 1870-1871, Swiss de facto practice moved
toward an automatic asylum right for military refugees, but without actually enshrining it into written law. This
came in handy toward the end of the war as it allowed Switzerland to refuse to admit certain highly undesirable
military and paramilitary personnel (SS, high-ranking Nazis and Fascists, etc.) I would like to thank Mr. Guido
Koller and Mr. Simon Hotte for clarifying this legal point for me.
49 For example, see p.146 of the report.14
sentative. This by no means diminishes their odious nature.
50 But, as mentioned above, numer-
ous refugees, including many Jews, who were initially refused admittance made several at-
tempts before finally gaining entry; therefore, they obviously had not been arrested immediately
upon their previous rejection, or rejections.
Moreover, there were also many cases, at least until November 1942 (occupation of France’s so-
called free zone), of refugees who arrived or were intercepted at the Jura mountain frontier with
German-occupied territory and who, as many had requested, were then transported, often by the
authorities, to a point near Geneva to be “expelled” (i.e. statistically rejected) into the free zone
where the risks for them were greatly reduced, or even non-existent for many refugees of French
nationality.
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Another aspect, which is often overlooked, is that many of those who were turned back were
not victims of persecution, or at least they were in less mortal danger than the Jews. This group
primarily included French evaders of Vichy’s S.T.O. (Service du Travail Obligatoire, i.e. Man-
datory Work Service). Since the S.T.O. provides a pertinent illustration as to the various groups
of potential refugees in Western Europe at the time, it is helpful to examine it more closely.
Formally instituted in February 1943, the S.T.O. originally aimed at sending 700,000 French
labourers to work in Germany. However, only 170,000 actually left. The others somehow man-
aged to escape, sometimes to or through Switzerland, or they joined the underground, or they
went into hiding by one means or another. In October 1943, Pierre Laval obtained the suspen-
sion of these lists, but the Germans requisitioned workers directly. From June 1942 to July
1944, a grand total of 641,500 French workers left for Germany (the Reich had demanded up to
2 million).
52 Very little is known, at least to me, about the fate of the S.T.O. evaders who, re-
jected at the Swiss border, were intercepted or arrested in France. However, it is unlikely that
the rule was deportation, or worse.
53
Another important category of potential refugees consisted of the millions of slave-labourers
whom the Germans had deported primarily from Eastern Europe to work in their factories,
farms, private homes, etc. Those who were close to the Swiss border often tried to escape to
Switzerland. The difficult question at the time was whether these people were in mortal danger,
and thus should have been admitted according to Swiss law, or whether they “merely” risked
some form of punishment, often harsh and brutal, but not extreme, in the event of their being
turned back at the border or of their being caught before reaching the frontier.
To my knowledge, there is no calculation, even rough, of asylum candidates arranged according
to the degree of risk they were in (persecuted Jews who faced certain death if caught by the
                        
50 As early as 1950, Pierre Béguin underlined the “odious nature of certain rejections” in a very interesting small
book (Le balcon sur l’Europe: petite histoire de la Suisse pendant la guerre 1938-1945).
51 See Henry Spira’s work, Le problème juif, Société jurassienne d’émulation, Proceedings 1998, pp. 306-307.
52 Of the two million French prisoners taken by the Germans in 1940, approximately half were requisitioned for
work.
53 According to a study done by the Geneva State Archives and published after the French version of this paper
came out, S.T.O. evaders who were caught could be fined, or imprisoned for a short time, but nothing more than
that. See: P. Flückiger, G. Bagnoud, C. Santschi et al., Les réfugiés civils et la frontière genevoise durant la
Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Archives d’Etat de Genève, 2000.15
Germans, others in similar danger, those who were less threatened, those in no real danger).
From this perspective, the refugees and those rejected covered an entire spectrum: from those in
danger of being murdered to those in relatively banal situations.
54 Below, I will however pro-
ceed on the assumption that most asylum seekers were in grave and often mortal danger. In
other words, for the rest of this text, the “typical refugee” will be considered as someone in real
danger.
A crucial question and a warning
Accepting, for the time being, that the report’s number of a total of 24,500 rejections is more or
less correct, we can now turn to the essential issue of admission chances or probabilities.
However, before continuing, I feel a warning is necessary: the following paragraphs and pages
are replete with statistics, numbers and calculations. The fact that they apply to situations as
tragic as that of many refugees could give, when discussed, an impression of technical aloof-
ness, or even cynicism.
No such impression is intended or justified. Indeed, it is the very nature of this tragic issue that
demands an in-depth analysis of all available information, including the numerical data. Other-
wise, the analysis will remain superficial, or unfounded, as will any subsequent moral judge-
ments. The Bergier report itself is full of numbers, albeit never exploited. Everybody knows the
remark, or quip, attributed to Joseph Stalin, “One death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statis-
tic”. Everybody also knows that six million people were victims of the Holocaust. But who
would dare say that we should ignore this horrifying fact, or that analysing it is technical or
even cynical, because it is nothing but a cold statistic?
Maybe this is also a question of professional training and sensibility: for economists, numbers
and statistics usually speak louder than words, provided of course that they are sufficiently
reliable.
55 This is not to say that “words” – i.e. decisions of principle and official pronounce-
ments by the authorities, guidelines, documents of all types and everything to be found in the
archives, in short, the entire official historical context – are unimportant. However, if numerical
data are ignored or left non-exploited, it will invite all sorts of misunderstandings and it will
likely lead to false conclusions.
                        
54  By accident, I happen to know of one case that can be rightly regarded as “banal”, that of a young Dutch student
from an aristocratic family whose story I will relate in order to illustrate my point. In 1942, tired of living under
Nazi occupation and  distressed to see the “best years” of his life wasted away in such circumstances, all of which
is completely natural and understandable, but being no more in immediate physical danger than most of his coun-
trymen, he decided to try his luck in Switzerland in order to continue his studies and live in freedom there, all of
which is equally natural and understandable. He boarded a train bound for Basel and duly arrived there without
being intercepted at the border (he hid in the restroom, but did not lock the door). Once in Basel, he presented
himself at the police station – only to be sent back to Holland on the first train. (I should point out that the Canton
of Basel-City was one of the most understanding toward refugees). Upon his return, he was not bothered in any way
on account of this attempted flight to Switzerland and he finished his studies soon after the war. Today he still
harbours feelings of bitterness toward Switzerland, despite my attempts to persuade him, by putting his case into a
more general context, that the Basel authorities had no other choice than to send him back.
55 As one of my American professors once told us,  “Above all watch what ‘they’ are doing, and not (only) what
they are saying, arguing or writing”.16
Admittance chances
The report’s conclusion provides the following information, which will serve as a starting point
for an initial answer to the question of the admittance chances or probabilities for the refugees:
The number of expulsions rose steeply beginning in August, 1942, and remained high until the
fall of 1943; more than 5,000 rejections of asylum-seeking refugees are documented in writing
during this period alone, out of more than 24,000 documented rejections for the entire wartime
period.
56
If we consider that the period from “August 1943” to the “fall of 1943” extends to the end of
December, 1943, a table in the report
57 shows a figure of 22,367 refugees admitted during this
time span. Using these data, a simple calculation yields a rate, or an “ex post” risk of rejection
of 18% per entry attempt (and not per refugee).
58 Or equivalently, an admittance probability of
no less than 82% per entry attempt.
59
Chances per refugee or per attempt?
In this context, it is very important, as already underlined, to distinguish between admittance
chances or probabilities per entry attempt and per refugee. Considering there were numerous
multiple attempts, and therefore a lot of double counting in the number of rejections, the prob-
abilities will necessarily be larger (i.e. better) per refugee than per attempt. This point should be
kept in mind as we proceed further. From a humanitarian perspective, the chances per refugee
are of course the most relevant. This is why I will attempt to estimate them below, for all refu-
gees throughout the entire war.
60
However, I will not be able to do this in some more specific contexts, such as for certain catego-
ries of fugitives, for which I will only present the admittance chances per attempt. For example,
the precise number of Jewish refugee rejections is not known with sufficient precision, therefore
it would be necessary to substitute some hypotheses for the missing data. As the estimate of
chances per person also necessitates a hypothesis (on the maximum number of attempts), the
calculation of admission chances per Jewish refugee would mean “piling up” too many hy-
potheses.
61
And at other times?
                        
56 P. 277.
57 P. 24.
58 5,000/(22,367 + 5,000) = 18%. This rejection rate is by entry attempt because, by definition and for a given
period: “number of refugees admitted” + “number of rejections” ≡  “number of entry attempts (successful or not)”.
This arithmetical formula yields, as it should, a rejection rate of 100% for a (hypothetical) period in which all
asylum-seeking refugees were rejected, and a rejection rate of 0% for a period (also hypothetical) in which all were
accepted. So as not to give a false impression of precision, no figures will be indicated after the decimal point.
59 100-18 = 82. If we were to end in September 1943 (beginning of the “fall”), the rejection rate would be 5,000/
(17,199+5,000) = 23% and the admission probability, 77%.
60 See below, the section entitled “Admittance chances per refugee: A few probability calculations”.
61 Research done after the French version of this study was published has however shown this to be possible after
all – and without “piling up too many hypotheses”. The conclusion was that admittance chances for Jewish refugees
were somewhat higher than those for all refugees. See, on my homepage, the following document: Refoulements et
réfugiés pendant la guerre – Critique des statistiques … et d’une ou deux autres choses, Jan. 2001.17
What, then, were the refugees’ admittance chances in the months immediately following the
(“theoretical”) decision to close the border? Once again, the report provides all the necessary
data
62 (also see graph 1 above):
From September 1 to December 31, 1942, 7,372 refugees were admitted; the (incomplete) sta-
tistics on rejections indicate at least 1,628 rejections for the same time period.
63
This amounts to a rate or risk of rejection of 18% per attempt, i.e. an admittance rate or prob-
ability of 82% – the same as above.
And what about the “emblematic” month of August 1942, given that the decision to close the
border was made on August 13 and reversed on August 23? According to the report:
From August 13, 1942, to the end of the month, 314 out of the 527 refugees who had entered
Switzerland were expelled.
64
This yields a rejection rate of 60%,
65 that is, an acceptance probability of only 40% per attempt.
However, immediately afterwards:
in the first week of September, 40 out of 259 were expelled,
which means a rejection rate of 15%, or an admission probability of 85% per attempt.
66
Always according to the data found in the report, 475 refugees were admitted in the entire
month of August: 262 between the 1
st and the 12
th,




68 This means that the number of refugees admitted during the eighteen days following
the border “closing” was only slightly less than the number for the thirteen days preceding it.
To repeat: these statistical calculations may perhaps strike the reader as abstract, or even inhu-
man, because they refer to situations that were often a matter of life or death. However, they
cannot be dispensed with if one is to accurately represent Swiss refugee policy as it was applied
                        
62 P. 152, n. 273.
63 The number of 1,628 rejections comes from summing up the monthly figures for August-December, 1942, in
columns A and B in one of Koller’s tables (op.cit., p. 94). They include identified and anonymous rejections.
However, it is not possible to add the numbers of these columns, as the report does, because some rejections listed
in the second column are also included in the first (see a further discussion below under  “Admittance chances per
month”). The figure of 1,628 rejections is therefore an overestimation (the correct figure is 1,164), which means
that the admittance chances calculated in the following paragraph are underestimated. – For an in-depth examina-
tion of the statistics on rejections, see the study mentioned in note 61.
64 P. 143, n. 234.
65 314/527 = 60%, on the assumption that “527 refugees who had entered Switzerland” means all those who arrived
at the frontier and not just those who were accepted. In the latter case the admittance rate would be 37% rather than
40%
66 40/259 = 15%, again on the assumption that these “259 refugees” were those who reached the border. If this
number only represents accepted refugees, the admittance probability would be 87%.
67 = 475-213
68 = 527-31418
in reality, and not in “theory”; and also if one seeks to separate the general from the particular –
see the pertinent quote from historian André Lasserre at the beginning of this section.
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A characterisation of Switzerland’s practice
toward refugees up to the fall of 1943
For the period from August, 1942, to the fall of 1943, as well as for all sub-periods enumerated
above with the exception of perhaps one, the general nature of Switzerland’s actual practice
toward the refugees is therefore clear and can be summarised thus: apart from a very brief and
in fact feeble crackdown in the few days immediately following the “theoretical” decision to
close the border, applicants for asylum had, in reality and on average, relatively high chances of
being admitted into Switzerland. (I will return to this concept of “average” chances.)
As a matter of fact, the country opened its borders rather widely. While officially stated policy
was rigid, the actual practice was much more flexible. Later, starting with the winter of 1942-
43, it became even more so, as did the official rhetoric.
Image and reality
It is quite clear that this conclusion, based on facts and substantiated by statistics, is in complete
contrast with the image portrayed by the Bergier report, and largely conveyed by the press; the
same is true of most other publications on the subject. Further on, I will venture a few com-
ments on how some Swiss historians work when they take on questions that require a modicum
of experience in handling numerical data.
Be that as it may, the Bergier report focuses on the authorities’ officially stated policy, a neces-
sary endeavour of course, yet it fails to evaluate systematically the practice actually followed
vis-à-vis the refugees.
Admittance chances per attempt for all refugees throughout the war
If we consider the entire wartime period, 51,129 “illegal” civilian refugees were admitted and
registered in Switzerland – in other words the equivalent of more than half the population of the
city of Lausanne at the time. When related to the total number of known rejections, this yields a
global probability or average rate of acceptance of 68% per attempt and for the entire war –
roughly a two-out-of-three chance.
70
These civilian refugees were said at that time to be “illegal” refugees, in as much as they were
asylum seekers who simply presented themselves at the border without a visa or other form of
official entry authorisation. As for the “legal” refugees, altogether absent from the Bergier re-
                        
69 To argue, on an emotional level, that the refugee issue is too serious and tragic to be analysed statistically would
be the same as saying that the more severe the disease, the less one needs state-of-the-art diagnostics.
70 If we use André Lasserre’s quarterly figures (op.cit., pp. 114, 174, 190), which cover the time period from the
first quarter of 1940 to the second quarter of 1945, 57,309 refugees were admitted, which indicates a rate or prob-
ability of admittance of 70% per attempt. These quarterly figures were obtained from the Federal Archives and
André Lasserre maintains that they are more homogeneous and reliable than monthly data. He however adds that
they may include a number of military refugees.19
port except for a few individual examples, they numbered no less than 9,909 according to
Guido Koller who takes his cue from Ludwig.
71
Admittance chances per refugee: A few probability-based calculations
72
Until now, I have concentrated on estimating admittance chances per attempt. From a humani-
tarian perspective, admission probabilities per person are obviously more relevant than those
per attempt. But, what can be said about the refugees’ chances as individuals? Can this question
really be analysed considering the unfortunate lack of complete records listing by name the
individuals who were rejected?
To be able to analyse, it is almost always necessary to simplify, or in other words to schematise.
We shall therefore consider the situation through the following schematic representation (to be
refined later in a few technical footnotes).
Asylum-seeking refugees who arrived at the border for the first time were either admitted or
rejected immediately (or perhaps after a brief delay). If they were admitted, the analysis stops at
this point, because they of course had no need to make a second attempt. So far, nothing very
schematic. Now, by way of simplification, let us assume that all those who were rejected made
a second and final attempt.
73 In other words, if rejected at the second attempt, they decided – we
shall assume – to give up and did not make a third, fourth or nth attempt. Two attempts at most
may in any case constitute a rather “conservative” estimate considering the numerous known
examples of refugees who made multiple entry attempts.
Thanks to this simplification, the situation can now be analysed quite easily by means of stan-
dard probability theory. What we thereby lose in realism, we will gain in clarity. (The reader
who is unfamiliar with probability theory may turn to the bottom of this page).
Let N be the total number of refugees who arrived at the frontier throughout the war; A the total
number of refugees admitted after their first or second attempt; D the number of definitive
rejections (those whose second attempt failed and who, by hypothesis, did not try again); p the
                        
71 See G. Koller op.cit., p.85 who writes the following which seems quite clear (my translation, italics supplied):
“Carl Ludwig lists 295,381 asylum-seekers who gained admission during the war, of which: 103,869 ‘military
refugees’, 55,018 ‘civilian refugees’, 9,909 ‘emigrants’, 251 ‘political refugees’, etc.” However, in a direct com-
munication to the author, Guido Koller has speculated that these 9,909 “emigrants” had mostly arrived before the
war. Henry Spira is of the same opinion. In short, this issue is far from clear and deserves further, more detailed
investigation. It is therefore unfortunate that there exists no study, as far as I know, which specifically investigates
those refugees with some sort of official entry authorisation who were admitted and who stayed in Switzerland
during the war (one reason for this could be that the relevant data are dispersed in the archives of different Can-
tons). Also, Ludwig’s number could possibly include legal refugees who entered Switzerland from 1945 to 1950.
The total of 9,600 visa requests which were granted during the period from the spring of 1938 to November 1944
(see report pp. 21 and 132), which is used again below, seems however to point to a significant number of new
“legal” refugees who were admitted during the war.
72 The impetus for this section came from a colleague, Professor Ulrich Kohli, from the Department of Economics
of the University of Geneva. For this I would like to extend to him my warmest thanks.
73 The simplification here is that some asylum candidates, for various reasons, gave up definitively after the first
failure. This is compensated by the fact that I am not considering the possibilities of 3, 4 or more attempts. See
below.20
admittance probability per attempt; and R the total number of rejections (temporary or defini-
tive). We can then write:
(1)     N ≡  A + D
(2)  A = N[ p + p(1-p)]
(3)  D = N(1-p)
2
(4)  R = N[ (1-p) + (1-p)
2]
On first sight, it would appear that we are faced with an underdetermined system comprising six
unknowns (N, A, D, p, D, R), but only four equations.
69 However, we know that A ≅  51,129
admitted refugees, and that R ≅  24,398 temporary or definitive rejections, which means four
unknowns and four equations.
The system (1)-(4) can therefore be solved, so that we easily arrive at:
70
−   p ≅  0,678, i.e. an estimated admittance probability of approximately 68% per attempt,
                          just as before
71; 
 
−    N ≅  57,086, i.e. an estimate of the total number of asylum-seeking refugees who arrived
                          at the frontier; and
−   D ≅  5,957,  i.e. an estimate of the number of  persons who were definitively turned back.
These numbers, calculated thanks to probability theory, give a deceptive impression of preci-
sion. Their interpretation is as follows: under the assumed conditions, the total number of refu-
gees who arrived at the border throughout the war is estimated at approximately 57,000 and the
total number of definitive rejections at about 6,000.
It is interesting that the estimate of some 6,000 definitive rejections is quite close to that of
Serge Klarsfeld (approximately 5,000).
From the above results, we can calculate that a refugee’s probability of being admitted after one
or at most two attempts was somewhere around 90%.
72 This means that a refugee had roughly a
                        
69 The reason the term (1-p) is squared in (3) and (4) is due to the hypothesis of a maximum of two attempts. If we
expand (2), we see that p
2 appears in it too, for the same reason.
70 In order to solve this system of equations, one can either use an iterative algorithm, supplying some initial
guesses for the unknowns, or rewrite it in the following manner which allows the solution to be calculated by hand:
p = A/(A + R)                [ p is obtained directly from the number of admissions and the number of rejections]
N = R/[ (1-p)+(1-p)
2]       [ equation (4) renormalized ]
D = N – A                      [ equation (1) renormalized ]   ,
i.e. inserting the values for R and A:
p = 51,129/(51,129 + 24,398)
N =  24,398/[ (1-p) + (1-p)
2]
D = N – 51,129
The first equation serves to calculate p, the second then immediately determines N, and the third D. Thus, these
three equations make up a recursive system. Equations (2) and (3) are not used, but it can be checked that they are
satisfied by the values found with the preceding three equations.
71 Because p can be calculated directly with the formula p = A/(A+R); see preceding note.
72 The probability of a definitive rejection after two attempts is ~5,957/~57,086 ≅  10%, which means a ~90%
chance of admittance with one or at most two attempts.21
two-out-of-three chance to be admitted on the first attempt and a nine-out-of-ten chance if,
having been rejected once, he or she tried a second and last time.
The reader may be surprised, even shocked, by these results. I will show below what makes
them “intuitively” credible.
The effects of a likely underestimation of rejection numbers
As we saw before, the number of 24,398 rejections is very likely an underestimation, because
all rejections were not registered and the archives are either incomplete or have not (yet) been
fully exploited.
If we assume for these reasons a plausible figure of approximately 30,000 rejections in all in-
stead of 24,398 as above, the same approach indicates an admission probability of 63% per
attempt, a total number of asylum candidates of approximately 59,200 and about 8,100 defini-
tive rejections.
73 The probability of being admitted after one or two attempts is therefore 86%,
just slightly lower than the figure we came up with above (90%). In these conditions, refugees
had roughly a little more than a three-out-of-five chance to be admitted at the first attempt and
close to a nine-out-of-ten chance if they made a second and last attempt.
It is thus clear that the potential underestimation of the number of rejections has very little
effect on the estimates of a refugee’s chances. On this count, these estimates are therefore ro-
bust, in the statistical sense.
If, hypothetically, there had been only 20,000 rejections, the estimates would be respectively
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20,000 ∼ 72% ∼ 55,500 ∼ 4,400 ∼ 92%
24,398 ∼ 68% ∼ 57,100 ∼ 6,000 ∼ 90%
30,000 ∼ 63% ∼ 59,200 ∼ 8,100 ∼ 86%
Hypothesis: refugees do not make more than two attempts, but they all make two if the first fails.
More than two attempts
As already mentioned, the above calculations do not allow for renewed attempts if the second
one failed whereas one knows of a fairly large number of individual cases with more than two
attempts. Table 2 shows the results obtained if we let the maximum number of attempts vary
from one to four (taking the figure of 24,398 for total rejections).
                        
73 This figure of 8,100 definitive rejections is higher than Serge Klarsfeld’s estimate (5,000), but it seems that he
only took into consideration the rejections at the border with German-occupied or Vichy-controlled France, but not

















1 ∼ 68% ∼ 75,500 ∼  24,398 ∼ 68%
2 ∼ 68% ∼ 57,100 ∼ 6,000 ∼ 90%
3 ∼ 68% ∼ 52,900 ∼ 1,700 ∼ 97%
4 ∼ 68% ∼ 51,700 ∼ 570 ∼ 99%
Hypotheses: there were approximately 24,398 rejections as against 51,129 refugees admitted;
refugees do not make more than N attempts, but all make N  if the preceding attempt(s) failed.


















1 ∼ 63% ∼ 81,100 ∼ 30,000 ∼ 63%
2 ∼ 63% ∼ 59,200 ∼ 8,100 ∼ 86%
3 ∼ 63% ∼ 53,800 ∼ 2,700 ∼ 95%
4 ∼ 63% ∼ 52,100 ∼ 970 ∼ 98%
                                      Hypothesis: there were approximately 30,000 rejections as against 51,129 refugees admitted;
                                      refugees do not make more than N attempts, but all make N if  the preceding attempt(s) failed.
Once again, we see that the figure used for the number of rejections has little impact on admis-
sion chances. It is therefore clear that the margin of error or uncertainty around the estimate for
the total number of rejections is of little importance. Note however that the hypothesis about the
maximum number of attempts does make a difference.
The numbers in tables 1, 2 and 3 speak well enough for themselves and we do not need to
comment further on them.
74 However, many will find them very surprising as they contrast so
starkly with the generally accepted image of the chances and fate of the refugees who arrived at
the Swiss border during the war.
Surprising results?
I do not wish, in any way, to belittle the grave situation faced by the several thousand refugees
who were definitively rejected. Yet, not all would have perished and some would have man-
aged to save themselves in other ways.
74 Of course, in a moral sense, each definitive rejection
                        
74 Some readers will no doubt consider the preceding reasoning and calculations to be too technical. There are
however obvious advantages to applying probability theory. If we do not use it, we can only calculate, by means of
a simple division, the admittance rate or chances per attempt, i.e. p = A /(A+R). With the tools of probability
theory, we can estimate the per person chances using the same A and R data, plus only a fairly “weak” (i.e. good)
hypothesis about the number of attempts per refugee.
74 According to present knowledge, only a comparatively small fraction of those refugees who were definitively23
can be considered as one too many – however see below the discussion on how many refugees
Switzerland would have been able to accept and support. In any case, the preceding results
must surely modify the prevailing image of a Switzerland that systematically rejected most of
the refugees who arrived at its borders.
75
The intuitive plausibility of these results can be made clear as follows.
Put yourself in the shoes of a “representative” (i.e. gravely threatened) fugitive who arrives at
the frontier. You know that if you do not obtain asylum, chances are that sooner or later you
will be arrested, eventually deported and sent to your death. You will then surely do absolutely
everything in your power to reach safety on Swiss territory. If your first attempt does not work
and you are not arrested on the other side of the border, you will try a second time, or more. If
you are unsuccessful at a certain border guard post, you will try your luck at other points along
the frontier. If your manner of presenting yourself fails, you will try another, etc.
76
As Doctor Samuel Johnson (1709-84) once put it, the perspective of imminent death concen-
trates the mind intensely.
77 In such extreme circumstances, human beings or at least many of
them generally become quite inventive and tenacious, which allows them to defy fate more
often than many, who luckily have never been in such a situation, would think.
78
This partially helps to explain why, despite the horrifying efficiency of the Nazi murder ma-
chine, 78% of French Jews successfully escaped the Holocaust (see below, table 5). Even 10%
of the Jewish community survived in Poland, which was occupied by the Nazis for almost five
years making any escape nearly impossible, and where much of the “Christian” population
reportedly tended to “co-operate” with the occupying forces when it came to hunting down
Jews.
79
                                                                            
rejected, and whose names are known, show up in the lists of the deportees from France to the Nazi concentration
or extermination camps.
75 A letter to the editor in the February 19, 2000, issue of Le Temps, signed by Brigitte Sion, provides an example
of this prevailing image, since it contains this rather surprising sentence: “From 1938 on, the [ Swiss]  gates were
shut for Jews who were headed for death”. The writer is Secretary General of the Intercommunity Coordination
Against Anti-Semitism and Defamation (CICAD), Geneva.
76 If, in a turn of bad luck, you are arrested on the other side of the border immediately after your attempt, or if you
are delivered directly to your persecutors, as unfortunately happened on occasion (see report p.146), you would not
have the opportunity to make a second attempt. However, the model (1)-(4) takes this into consideration. At the
initial attempt, the risk consists of not gaining admission into Switzerland (if you are arrested before arriving at the
border, you would not be included in the number of those attempting to enter the country). At a second try, there is
the additional risk of your being arrested before you are able to make this repeat attempt. The model assumes that
the risk is the same for the two attempts. This is justifiable because the additional risk you run before making a
second attempt will often be compensated, at least in part, by other factors such as the fact that you are more fa-
miliar with the terrain, how to proceed at the frontier, what to say and what not to say, etc. Finally, the fact that the
model rules out more than two attempts serves as a counterbalance to the possibly increased risk at a second at-
tempt.
77 “Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows that he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonder-
fully” (according to James Boswell in his biography of Johnson).
78 To continue the discussion from n. 76, the fact that “you” have decided to attempt to find refuge in Switzerland
means that you are not one of the unfortunates (or resigned or fearful) who awaited or had to await their fate pas-
sively.
79 Of course, many of the survivors lived in the part of Poland that was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939-1941
and presumably then fled with the retreating Soviet armies. – By chance, I happened to meet someone whose story24
The report’s unexploited data
As stated above, the report makes no attempt to calculate or estimate the refugees’ admittance
chances or rejection rates. This is difficult to understand for at least three reasons.
First of all, the report contains all the necessary data for such estimations, as I have shown. In
addition, these estimates are extremely easy to calculate, at least for the chances per attempt (a
simple division is sufficient
80). Secondly, how can it be possible to analyse – and judge – the
decision to close the borders in particular, and Swiss refugee policy in general, without deter-
mining the essential characteristics and parameters of the situation? Thirdly, the (uncalculated)
concepts of “admittance rates or chances” and “rejection rates or risks” actually appear in the
text of the report, which proves that they should not be ignored – e.g.:
(...) Different groups of refugees had very unequal chances of obtaining asylum. The risk of
being turned away at the border was very different for different groups of refugees
81 (...)
Along some stretches of the border, the rejection percentage was high whereas in other areas
officials were much more liberal.
82
 
Why did these data remain unexploited? Why did the report not go further and attempt to es-
timate these “chances”, “risks” and “percentages”?  Could it be that the researchers were trai-
ned solely in traditional history and therefore did not have sufficient experience with handling
numerical data: an inadequate “numeracy”? Or, did they decide not to do the calculations be-
cause the results would possibly contradict the report’s conclusions? Or did they do the calcu-
lations and not publish the results? Only the Commission could answer these questions.
High, but variable admittance chances
The passages quoted above from the report draw our attention to the fact that admittance
chances obviously varied according to (1) time, (2) place and (3) the category of refugees:
factors which, by definition, are not taken into consideration by general averages. Also, these
average probabilities – the general, or the more specific ones which I will investigate below –
are only valid for those fugitives who actually attempted to gain asylum in Switzerland, that is,
                                                                            
illustrates perfectly the inventiveness and tenacity that arises in many when faced with such circumstances. He was
a young Jewish man living in Warsaw and who, at the occupation of this city, soon saw the direction events were
going to take. He thus decided that he had to obtain a “certificate of Aryan origin”, which would allow him to pass
for a Christian. A medical exam was necessary for this certificate, the main or only test being that of circumcision
verification. He therefore made an appointment at one of the few ... female doctors in Warsaw, who provided him
with the certificate without going through too close an examination. Thanks to other such “tricks” (changing his
name, for example, by bribing a bureaucrat), he managed to survive the Holocaust and after the war, began a new
life in Mexico and then in the USA, where I met him and where he lived until his death. His wife and daughter also
survived. They found refuge in a convent and with a farmer’s family, which proves that not all Poles participated in
the hunt for Jews. For this reason, the family is and has always been quite attached to Poland and its people.
80 As long as it is done correctly, which is not always the case. For example, some other works define the rejection
rate as: “rejection rate” = “number of those rejected”/”number of those admitted”. If, in some hypothetical period,
the number of refugees admitted were none, this would mean a division by zero…
81 P. 133; italics mine.
82 P. 140; italics mine; the word “percentage” is found in the French-language version of the report, but not in the
English one.25
those who reached the border. The possible repercussions of Swiss policy on the decision
whether or not to try to enter Switzerland will be discussed below.
For factor (1), i.e. the variations according to time, the preceding estimates for various periods
and sub-periods [see also summary table 4 at the end of this chapter] are a first confirmation
that admittance chances fluctuated significantly over time, as they range from 40% per attempt
– in the seventeen days following the decision to close the border in August 1942 – to 85%
immediately afterward, in the first week of September 1942. It should be noted that the 40%
probability seems to be an “outlier” (an extreme observation which is not representative) be-
cause it concerns a very short period. The other probabilities, for longer periods, range from 68
to 82% per attempt, and from 85 to more than 95% per person on average.
Admittance chances per month
Guido Koller provides monthly rejection numbers in an article
84 whose figures were used un-
critically and often erroneously in the report. By comparing these numbers with those of ad-
mitted refugees, it should be possible to calculate the admittance rate or probability per attempt
for each month of the war, or at least from April 1940, which is the first month with a non-
zero number of rejections. This would allow for a more precise and systematic analysis. Re-
grettably, the monthly figures given for “anonymous rejections” cannot be used for this pur-
pose.
85
For want of something better...
However, there is a stopgap or “second-best” method. For the whole of the war, the ratio of the
total number of known rejections to the number of identified people rejected is 2.51.
86 By ap-
plying this ratio to the monthly numbers of identified rejections, which are statistically usable
for the period from August 1942 to May 1945 (i.e. ignoring the very small numbers before the
initial date), we come up with the monthly admittance rates or probabilities shown in Graph 3
below. This procedure is dependent on the hypothesis that the ratio is approximately the same
for each month, which is not guaranteed. As I said before, this is a stopgap or “second-best”
approach.
                        
84 Op.cit., table 4, p. 94.
85 In fact, G. Koller’s monthly figures for anonymous rejections (op.cit, column B of table 4) do not correspond,
when added up, to the annual totals indicated at the bottom of the table: for 1942 for example, adding the monthly
figures produces 1,263 rejections whereas the total number at the bottom of the table is only 605. Asked about this
on two occasions, Mr. Koller kindly explained to me the reason for this discrepancy: some rejectees included in
column B (“other statistical sources”) are also included in column A (identified rejectees whose names were regis-
tered). But it is not possible to calculate a net monthly series of rejections because the archives used for column B
do not allow for a monthly breakdown in certain months. Note that of a total of 14,695 anonymous rejections that
G. Koller adds to the number of identified rejections, no less than 10,782 (73%) are attributed to the short period
going from October 1943, to March1944.







43:01 43:07 44:01 44:07 45:01
%
Monthly Admittance Probabilities or Rates
for 'Illegal" Asylum Seekers (per attempt)
August 1942 - May 1945 Graph 3
Unweighted Average of these
Montly Admittance Rates = 61%
Weighted Average Admittance
Rate Throughout  the War = 68%26
Open or closed doors?
On that basis, we see that the monthly admittance probabilities seem to have greatly fluctuated
over time. More exactly, in a few months, the borders were more closed than open, with esti-
mated admittance probabilities of only 40-50% per attempt, or even just slightly higher than
25% in October 1944.
87 In other months, fortunately more numerous and not just at the end of
the war,
88 the borders were in fact opened quite widely, with admittance chances per attempt
of 60-80%, and even higher.
89
An inverse relationship
A close examination of Graph 3 reveals something quite interesting: at each of the four immi-
gration peaks, when pressure at the border was intense, acceptance chances were relatively
high (see shaded areas of the graph) and vice versa. Thus, in September-December 1942, these
chances were close to 80%, after which controls tightened until the middle of 1943. We can
observe the same pattern in the fall of 1943 and at the very end of the war, however not so
clearly in the summer-fall of 1944.
Therefore, the rejection rate tended to be low when pressure at the border was high, and vice
versa. The country in fact opened its borders at the most necessary and crucial moments from a
humanitarian point of view. The reasons for this will be examined below.
This inverse relationship can be seen better – and the negative correlation can be tested –
through the use of so-called normalised series.
90 Graph 4 and the data it contains demonstrate
that this inverse relationship is highly significant.
91
                        
87 However, the admittance rate for October 1944 (26%) came just after the exceptionally high rate for September
of that same year (89%).
88 There is no obvious trend in the rates that appear in Graph 3.
89 The distribution of these monthly rates (August 1942-May 1945 = 34 observations) is characterised as follows,
where it is justified to use decimals: average (non-weighted) = 60.7%; median = 59.2%; standard deviation = 15.6
percentage points; maximum value = 89.4%; minimum value = 26.1%; the null hypothesis of a normal distribution
is not rejected according to the Jarque-Bera test, with a probability of 74%. Note that the standard deviation is
high, which indicates a strong variation in these monthly rates.
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Why this inverse relationship?
If we accept, for the time being, that there was a direct and unidirectional causal link [i.e. an
increased pressure at the border (= cause) tended to induce a drop in the rejection rate (= ef-
fect)], several non-mutually exclusive reasons for this link can be given. For our purposes, I
will divide them into two groups. The first group consists of reasons resulting from Swiss de-
cisions, official or not, but relatively conscious: decisions that would implicate the country.
The reasons in the second group are of a more accidental or less conscious nature.
Relatively conscious decisions...
92
First of all, it is possible that the authorities explicitly decided that Swiss practice (but not the
official line) should become more flexible and humanitarian at times of greater influx at the
border, only to return to tighter control after the crises. This is certainly what happened in the
period from the summer to the end of 1942, as we have seen. A high influx of refugees may
also have led to increased involvement not only on the part of aid organisations but also of
private citizens, as was demonstrably the case at some specific moments, particularly in the
border regions of Geneva, Jura and Ticino. Also, the greater the number of refugees massed
along the frontier, the more “visible” the rejections would be. This visibility might have made
it more difficult to turn refugees away discretely, even if some of those in charge would have
preferred to follow orders more closely. Finally, psychological stress might have been quite
intense for those, in the field and elsewhere, who made decisions affecting the refugees: to turn
one isolated refugee away is one thing, to reject a multitude is another.
                                                                            
standard deviation. One thus gets a “normalised” series with zero mean and unit standard deviation. If two different
time series are normalised, one can verify by superposing them whether they tend to fluctuate together, in an in-
verse fashion, or independently.
91 An F of 19.4 is significant at the level of 0.011% (there is only a 0.011% chance that the two series are not
correlated). It is however possible that this very high degree of significance is somewhat exaggerated. According to
Guido Koller, the number of unregistered rejections could have been relatively higher at periods of increased
influx. However, the underestimation would have to be extreme for this negative correlation to become non-
significant. Strictly speaking, this correlation is only valid for identified refugees (multiplying a series by a con-
stant, as here by 2.51, does not change its correlation with another series).
92 This paragraph, and the one that follows, expand on and clarify a section from my recent book; op.cit., pp. 67-8.28
...and contingent factors that were accidental or less conscious
In this second group of reasons it is possible that, at moments when the border was flooded
with refugees, there was a lesser risk of being spotted, intercepted and turned back (if one
refugee, or a group, was arrested and taken away, those who arrived next would find reduced
surveillance at the border). Odds were also better for successfully crossing the narrow frontier
zone where the risk of being expelled was generally higher. In addition, as refugees reached
the border in greater numbers, they may have had a better opportunity to exchange information
among themselves and help each other. Last but not least, it is also known that the border
guards were simply overwhelmed at times when a large mass of refugees arrived at the fron-
tier.
93
For moral and other reasons, it is quite important to determine which of these two groups of
reasons was more influential in Swiss practice. Before discussing this, it is however necessary
to examine a larger question.
A more general question
While this inverse relationship is statistically significant enough to constitute an observed fact,
it presents a more general question that is central for understanding it, i.e.: is there a causal
link between the rejection rate and the number of refugees seeking asylum in Switzerland?
And if so, which factor was the cause and which was the effect? Or equivalently, what was the
direction of causality?
This question is more complex than it appears on the surface. While it seems a priori plausible
that the number of those arriving at the borders fluctuated mainly because of changes in the
personal situation they faced (for example, the application of the “final solution” in 1942 or
the occupation of Italy in 1943), these fluctuations may also have been partly induced by
variations, either conscious or accidental but autonomous, in Swiss practice as measured by
the variable rate of rejection
94,
 in which case the causal link would be in the other direction.
The direction of causality
Regarding the latter hypothesis, it is quite possible that at times of increased influx at the bor-
der and visibly more liberal acceptance practices, this encouraged (or “induced”) some –
probably not very many – people, particularly from frontier regions, to attempt to enter Swit-
zerland whereas, in ordinary circumstances, they would not have done so.
Nevertheless, the principal causal chain and its direction are quite evident when one consults
the available historical information. At the outset, independent  events occurred outside of
Switzerland, such as the application of the “final solution” and the occupation of Italy, which
made the lives of some inhabitants in Nazi-controlled or occupied areas difficult, dangerous or
                        
93 The report cites (on p.153) a memorandum dated March 1944 from a Colonel Bolzani who was stationed at the
Ticino border: “We must face the fact that the guards at the outermost border have been overwhelmed by the influx
of refugees, otherwise four-fifths of these people (sic) would have had to be turned back”.
94 But not, nota bene, by changes in the (“theoretical”) guiding principles of official policy. I will return to this
point.29
unbearable. These events induced a more or less large proportion of these people – those who
wanted and were able to, or who did not try some other way out – to try their luck in Switzer-
land. In turn, this incited or obliged Swiss decision-makers to demonstrate greater flexibility
than at other times, for more or less conscious and accepted reasons. Hence a drop in rejection
rates which was further strengthened by the accidental or less conscious factors described
above.
95
Causality tests, another approach to the question, and conclusion
The so-called Granger causality tests, as used in modern econometrics, can help us here. These
statistical tests are not perfect, in that they verify the extent to which a variable can be pre-
dicted by another variable, but they do not really test causality in its strict epistemological
sense.
96 In any case, when applied to the situation at hand, they do indicate, although not in a
highly significant manner, that the causality goes from the influx of refugees to the rejection
rate, in other words in the same direction suggested by historical information.
97
This general question can also be broached in another manner, to arrive at the same conclu-
sion. Since this other approach is rather technical, it is discussed in a footnote.
98
To wrap up this discussion, the following conclusion appears quite solid, even if it contradicts
the generally accepted view: during the most critical periods, when a host of asylum-seeking
refugees crowded the borders and when “pressure” on Switzerland was intense, the borders
were in fact opened quite widely. The data allow little doubt on this subject.
The question remains as to whether this behaviour was more the result of conscious decisions,
official or otherwise, or more the result of accidental or uncontrolled factors. All I can say
about this is that the conscious and responsible decisions described above are at least partly
                        
95 Ulrich Kohli of the University of Geneva has suggested, and I thank him for this input, another possibility con-
cerning this inverse relationship (i.e. the negative correlation between the two series); namely, that there might not
be a direct causal link between the two, but that both might be influenced by a third factor. For example, a setback
for the Allied forces or the rumours of a massacre could simultaneously create an influx of refugees and feelings of
sympathy for them in the country.
96 They could therefore suffer from the post hoc ergo propter hoc sophism.
97 With three monthly lags, the null hypothesis that the rejection rate is not Granger-caused by the total number of
refugees who arrived at the border is rejected with a 11% probability of error (F = 2.21). If data of higher fre-
quency (weekly or daily) were available, the test could be more conclusive. Moreover, it is necessary to keep in
mind that the monthly figures used were extrapolated from the numbers of rejected refugees who were identified by
name.
98  In this other approach, the answer to the question hinges on whether the number of refugees at the border is a
good indicator of “pressure at the border”. This leads to the use of notions that standard demographic analysis
applies to migratory movements, meaning pull factors (Switzerland’s “attractiveness” for the refugees) as opposed
to push factors (motivations for refugees to seek asylum in Switzerland). In economics, one would analogously
speak of “supply and demand”, which raises the problem, classic in econometrics, of “identification”. Many con-
siderations lead to the conclusion that the numbers of refugees who arrived at the border trace the “demand” curve
more so than the “supply” one, which means that the numbers of refugees at the border is an accurate measure for
the pressure at the border (even though an econometric estimate of the “demand” elasticity would be biased toward
zero, if it had to or could be calculated). It was a discussion with Guido Koller that prompted me to explore this
different approach.30
the reason why the country opened its borders widely, which is quite important from a hu-
manitarian and moral perspective.
Variations in space
For factor (2), variations according to place, the report does not provide data that would allow
for the calculation of admittance chances not only at specific moments in time but also at spe-
cific points along the border. No such data seem to exist. However, it is certain that admittance
rates or chances also greatly fluctuated in space.
99
Dual nature of the official policy line toward refugees
These variations in space, and even more so in time, were inevitable as they were the results of
the dual nature of the official refugee policy as it was first conceived, and then actually carried
out in practice.
On the one hand, the authorities’ rather rigid guiding principle was that official policy had to
be restrictive so that, according to them, the country should not be submerged, or for still other
reasons.
100 On the other hand, particularly after the experience in 1942 (see above), these
authorities wanted – or were forced – to demonstrate a certain flexibility in practice, especially
in circumstances such as when the borders were flooded with refugees or for specific catego-
ries of fugitives (children, women, elderly, etc.) whose numbers fluctuated in time.
101 This
flexibility also increased as the war neared its end.
As directives were often unclear, application was more or less decided upon by officers in the
field, often leading to a general state of confusion.
102 It was therefore inevitable that rejection
rates would vary according to place and time. There is yet another reason for all of this, which
I will examine below (the problem of the policy’s credibility).
Jewish refugees
One factor remains to be examined, i.e. (3) the variations according to category of refugees,
meaning in particular Jewish refugees. According to the report, the civilian Jewish refugees
who were admitted during the war numbered approximately 21,304 people out of a total of
                        
99 “Along some stretches of the border, many refugees were expelled seriatim, whereas simultaneously in other
areas officials were much more liberal” (report p.140). “The great majority of the expelled refugees were Jews
from Belgium, Holland and France. A majority of them initially had attempted to cross the border in the Jura
mountains, but the number entering through the Geneva Lake region over the course of the month [September
1942] amounted to more than 95% of all attempted border crossings” (p. 143, n. 234). It should be noted that a
large majority of the Jews living in Belgium had kept their German or Polish citizenship, or had become stateless.
On the other hand, Jews coming from Holland were for the most part of Dutch nationality.
100 A guiding principle that is amply documented, and justifiably so, in the report as well as by Lasserre, Koller and
others. In fact, many works on the refugee issue concentrate on the official policy line much more than on the
actual practice... The official rhetoric tends to fascinate more than the general reality (individual case studies also
tend to fascinate – and rather unduly so).
101 For the criteria adopted in September, 1942, see Koller, op.cit., p. 36.
102 Report p. 144: “The Police Division’s contradictory directives had created a confused legal situation that left
decisions in individual cases up to the discretion of the individual border guard or another control authority”. This
is described in detail in Koller, op.cit., passim.31
51,129, or 42%.
103 Therefore, contrary to general impressions, all the refugees were not Jewish
– in fact, less than half were (of course, other refugees were also often in danger of being ar-
rested or killed). In this respect the report tends to concentrate on the Jewish refugees, but does
not comment much on the other groups.
Georg Kreis provides an identical breakdown of civilian refugee groups: approximately 42%
were of Jewish faith or origin, 44% were Catholic and 5% were Protestant.
104 However, not all
refugees divulged their religion, or in the case of the Jews, some certainly provided false in-
formation as a defensive measure. Therefore, the proportion of Jewish refugees to the total is
likely underestimated.
Proportion of Jewish refugees
As demonstrated in graphs 5 and 6 below, the first “wave” of illegal refugees – from June-July
1942 until the beginning of 1943, when the “final solution” was implemented in Western
Europe – included a large majority of Jews. This was only slightly less the case during the sec-
ond wave (summer-fall 1943) at the Italian surrender and the Wehrmacht’s occupation of the
Peninsula.
These statistics are significant from a moral – or any other – perspective in light of the fact,
established above, that at times of greatest influx of refugees the borders opened the widest.
This was consequently also very likely to be the case for the Jewish refugees. As for the two
peaks in entries of Jewish refugees at the beginning of 1945, they are probably linked to the
admission of Jews who, due to various initiatives, had been rescued from German camps.
To my knowledge, there exists no breakdown of rejections according to religion or “race”.
105
However, it is highly unlikely that all of those rejected were Jewish,
106 at all points of the bor-
                        
103 See table 2 on page 25 where it is explained that out of 21,304 Jewish refugees there were 1,809 people of
another faith, but who were persecuted because they were of Jewish origin.
104 This adds up to a total of 91%, which suggests that 9% of the admitted civilian refugees were of another relig-
ions, without a religion or did not provide the information. See G. Kreis, Revue Suisse d’Histoire, 97/4, p. 573.
105 In theory, this should have been possible as early as December 29, 1942 for the religion of the rejec-
tees identified by name: it was at this point that authorities decided that the religion of those rejected should be
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der and at all times.
107 Even so, at specific moments such as the first week in September 1942,
“the great majority of the expelled refugees were Jews from Belgium, Holland and France”.
108
However note that if most rejections in that and other similar periods concerned Jewish per-
sons, this was because the overwhelming majority of asylum-seeking persons were Jewish.
Let us suppose for a moment that all those rejected over the entire war were Jewish. Under
this extreme hypothesis, unlikely though it is, the average rejection rate just for Jewish refu-
gees would be 53% per attempt,
109 or an average admission probability of 47% – roughly a one
out of two chance per attempt. This latter estimate is certainly much too low, as will be seen.
Other hypotheses and approaches
Henry Spira, who has done some work on this issue
111, proposes a seemingly more realistic
hypothesis that the proportion of Jewish rejectees to the total of those rejected was somewhere
around two-thirds, or approximately 16,000 Jews turned away.
112 If this estimate is correct
[ but more recent research has shown it to be much too high] , the average admittance rate or
probability for Jewish fugitives would be 57% per attempt, throughout the war.
113
On the other hand, Serge Klarsfeld has asserted, “no more than half of the 24,000 rejections
found in the Bergier report were against people of Jewish origin”.
114 According to this other
estimate, the admittance probability for Jewish refugees shifts to 64%, again per attempt and
over the entire war.
This issue can also be examined from another perspective. As already stated, the wave of refu-
gees from June-July 1942, to the end of that year was primarily associated with the carrying
out of the “final solution” in the occupied territories. In this period, the overwhelming majority
of the refugees were Jewish (see graphs 5 and 6 above). The report indicates
115 that between
August 13 and the end of December 1942, approximately 7,899 refugees were accepted
116 and
                                                                            
106 The following is what G. Koller has written on the subject (op.cit., p. 97, my translation): “The anonymous
statistics on rejections convey no information about the share of Jewish refugees. The rejectees were by no means
all Jewish and they included many non Jewish French and Italians who did not want to be drafted into the S.T.O.,
or into the German army, as well as Polish and Russian slave-workers who tried to escape from Germany”.
107 Some historians do not hesitate to say so. For example, Heinz Roschewski (op.cit, p.134) writes: “At least
30,000 Jews were registered as rejected”! This may be a slip, but a revealing one.
108 P. 143, n. 234. However, the text of the report is ambiguous here and it is not clear whether this passage refers
uniquely to the first week of September 1942.
109 24,500/(24,500+21,304) = 53%
111 And who has studied in particular the fate of refugees at the Jura frontier.
112 See Le Temps from December 17, 1999, p. 10. The article says that H. Spira bases his hypothesis “on his own
[ unpublished]  statistics”. Also see his article in the Revues historique neuchâteloise, issue of January-March, 1998.
– Research done after the French version of this paper was published has however shown that Spira’s estimated
proportion is much too high; see the work done at the Geneva State Archives mentioned in note 53 and my study
mentioned in note 61. In both cases, the conclusion was that Jewish refugees had higher than average chances of
being admitted.
113 21,305/(21,304+16,000) = 57%.
114 See the December 16,1999, issue of Le Temps, p.13. Klarsfeld’s proportion is however also too high, as more
recent research has shown; see note 112.
115 P.143, n. 234 and p. 52, n. 273.
116 = 527+7,372.33
approximately 1,949 were rejected.
117 Assuming that all of those accepted and turned away
were Jewish, we come up with an admittance rate of no less than 80% per attempt at this mo-
ment of intense urgency. [ According to more recent research as mentioned previously, the ac-
ceptance rate for Jewish refugees was actually in excess of 90% per person in that crucial pe-
riod] .
Summary, what may be retained, and further questions
Table 4 on the next page summarises the various estimates of admittance probabilities found
in the preceding pages and notes [ but excluding the results of more recent work] .
Faced with all these estimates of admittance rates and probabilities, the reader may wonder
which aspects are the most important to remember. I propose the following:
•   For all asylum candidates, in all categories throughout the war, the average
probability of gaining admission into Switzerland was somewhere around 67%
per attempt, or roughly two chances out of three. Assuming, in general, that refu-
gees made a second and final attempt if their first failed, the estimate jumps to
nine chances out of ten per person. The latter estimate has been confirmed by a
recent and very thorough archive-based study done by the Geneva State Archives
for the situation in the Geneva region (where roughly 40% of all entries took
place).
•   For shorter time periods, estimated admittance probabilities for all refugees
varied greatly, ranging according to month from 40-50% (or even 25% in one in-
stance) to almost 90% per month and per attempt.
•   For Jewish refugees, more recent research has shown that their acceptance
chances were higher than average, both per attempt and per person.
One question could emerge from the data collected in this table: given admittance prob-
abilities which, for the most part, were quite high or favourable, why is it that not more
people in Europe, and Jews in particular, sought asylum in Switzerland? This question
will be examined below.
Table 4























                        


























































a/ Rate or probability per attempt, not per refugee.
b/ “First week of September”.
c/ Unweighted average of the monthly rates (graph 3); hypothesis: there is an approximately constant re-
lationship between the total number of rejectees and the number of those identified by name.
d/ Hypothesis: all rejectees were Jewish estimate surely much too low.
e/ Hypothesis (Spira): about two thirds of the rejectees were Jewish; estimate much too low.
f/ Hypothesis (Klarsfeld): half the rejectees were Jewish; estimate still much too low.
h/ Hypothesis: in this period all the refugees and all the rejectees were Jewish; estimate too low.
g/ Estimated probability per refugee; hypothesis: at most two attempts.
Conclusion
To conclude this chapter on the (“theoretical”) decision to close the border in August, 1942, I
should like to underline that the most striking aspect of the report’s treatment of this issue is
the contrast between, on the one hand, the simple narrative, the individual case studies, the
unexamined numerical data, etc.; and on the other hand, a clear and categorical condemnation
of said decision. Between the two there is a sort of “quantum leap” and an essential link is
missing, i.e. a reasoned, analytically coherent and verified (through numerical data, among
other things) reconstruction of this “essential moment” in Swiss refugee policy.
The same applies to the entire report: the whole of Swiss refugee policy is never placed in the
context of an analytic, reasoned, coherent and verified representation (or model). This lack,
however, does not impede the report from reaching conclusions and formulating judgements
that are, more often than not, utterly negative.35
2. The “J” Stamp Affair
I would like to state from the very start that the manner in which the report handles this second
central issue strikes me as, in part, rather tortuous and tortured.
To begin, it is important to investigate which side, the Reich or Switzerland, proposed the spe-
cific procedure of placing a “J” stamp in the passports of German and (former) Austrian Jews,
so as to effectively establish the origins of this idea. The following are citations on the subject
from various passages of the report. I suggest that the reader pay close attention to the wording
(italics have been added for this purpose):
(...) Switzerland participated in stamping the passports of German Jews with a “J”
118 (…) The
negotiations between Switzerland and Germany after the annexation of Austria in 1938 re-
sulted in the marking of passports of German Jews with the “J” stamp
119 (...) The German
authorities gave their consent when Swiss officials proposed a distinctive marking of pass-
ports limited to German “non-Aryans”. The choice of the marking, be it a stamp with appro-
priate wording, the underlining of the passport holder’s name in red, or a “J”, was only a
matter of defining a technical detail once the agreement had been reached in principle
120 (...)
The documents in the archives do not allow us to be absolutely certain about who – Germans
or Swiss – proposed a distinctive “J” stamp marking for Jews in German passports.
121
                        
118 P. 17.
119 P. 273, “Conclusion”.
120 P. 4 of the press release.
121 P. 82.36
In another passage of the report, this lack of “absolute certitude” concerning the specific ori-
gins of the “J” stamp formula is however replaced by a clear affirmation: 
122
This letter
123 was mentioned in the NZZ of May 5, 1988 (...) as evidence that the Federal
Council yielded to the proposal of the German Foreign Office. This can be affirmed for the
specific form which the marking took (the “J” stamp).
124
Reasons for this “nuance”
This type of “nuance” or internal contradiction – and there are others – is certainly the result of
a process of collective writing, where one pen does not necessarily know what the others are
doing. More generally, the sometimes inconsistent nature of the report most likely stems from
the fact that the “deciding body” was ultimately the Commission itself. This nine-member
committee had the responsibility of deciding what to retain, eliminate or modify in the initial
drafts, or what should be added. These drafts were mostly written by the Commission’s nu-
merous subordinate collaborators (who may sometimes have felt a little unhappy about their
subordinate status).
125
According to what one hears, these Commission decisions, or at least some, were made
through majority voting, which could explain why the final product is often somewhat hetero-
geneous and inconsistent.
126 In contrast, the unity and balanced nature of the Ludwig report
(practically perfect in my opinion
127) as well as the Bonjour report (more debatable on some
points, again in my opinion) are due to the fact that each of these reports was written by one
and only one person, who then assumed full responsibility for the results. Unfortunately, these
previous examples were not used as models. Clearly, it would have been preferable to entrust
this official history project to one person, not to a Commission, and to provide this person with
more ample means (funds, assistants, etc.) than what Ludwig and Bonjour had at their dis-
posal.
128
                        
122 P. 80, n. 35; italics mine.
123 This letter dates from September 7, 1938. In it, Franz Kappeler, advisor to the Swiss Legation in Berlin, in-
formed Bern of the German Foreign Office’s response to the Swiss propositions.
124 The NZZ article in question was written by Alfred Cattani, historian and former associate editor of that newspa-
per, all of which the report fails to mention. Generally speaking, the Commission has a regrettable tendency to omit
the names of its critics or those who think differently than it does. – In this quotation, here is what was omitted by
the ‘(...)’ symbol: “(In the NZZ article, this letter) was mentioned without presenting the decisive words (‘to re-
spond in every possible way to Switzerland’s wishes’) and was considered as evidence that, etc.” This could give
the impression that Alfred Cattani deliberately omitted these “decisive” words in his NZZ article because they
incriminated Switzerland in the “J” stamp affair. Actually, the “wishes” of Switzerland were to be able to distin-
guish German emigrants (Jewish and non-Jewish) from other travellers crossing the common border with Germany.
It was therefore a general concern that was not particularly incriminating in the context of the time. See below.
125 I am not the only one who finds the report to be somewhat inconsistent, incoherent and repetitious. Historian
Jean-Claude Favez did as well: “The narrative is too long, sometimes confusing, often repetitious”; Domaine
Public, January 14, 2000.
126 In this respect, one recalls the well-known, ironic definition of a camel: “A horse designed by a commission”.
127 Hence the dedication at the beginning of this text.
128 The authorities were, however, aware of the problem: “The Federal Council agrees with the project of the
Commission of Judicial Affairs [of the National Council] (...) [It] examines (...) the possibility of entrusting the
general direction of this research to a person whose standing, both scientific and moral, is acknowledged by all so
as to guarantee that the final results are presented as a consistent whole.” (See the Federal Council’s opinion on37
Be that as it may, we can take it as a fact that the impetus for the specific “J” stamp formula
came from the German side. However, this is not made clear at all in the report, which uses all
sorts of methods to side-track the reader. For example, the “clear affirmation” above is found
in a footnote. 
An unimportant question?
When all is said and done, to affirm or insinuate, as has been done, that the origin of the spe-
cific “J” stamp formula is a technical question and therefore unimportant, can be justified from
a historiographical perspective. In the overall context of the policy toward the refugees as well
as that of Switzerland before and during the war in general, the “J” stamp was indeed just one
episode among many others and it was indeed relatively unimportant at the time both for the
refugees (I will return to this point) and for the authorities.
This issue however has had an enormous impact on the shaping of public opinion throughout
the world concerning Swiss refugee policy, and it has become a symbol for Switzerland’s al-
leged guilt.
129 If, at the publication of the report, the German origins of the specific “J” stamp
formula had been duly highlighted, the world’s image of Switzerland, as it was during the war
and is now, would perhaps be different.
A shocking case of ambiguity, and its explanation
The following quote affords a particularly striking and extreme example of ambiguity. It is
found in the most visible spot of the report, at the beginning of the final section of its conclu-
sion
130 and at the top of its last page (at the time of the report’s publication, many, and in par-
ticular many journalists, most likely began their reading by the conclusion and did not read
anything else due to time pressures in today’s news industry):
What would have happened if, in the summer of 1938, Switzerland had not insisted on having
the passports of German Jews marked with the “J” stamp? 
131
Anyone reading this sentence, which appears after several pages without one reference to the
“J” stamp, would most likely understand that during the German-Swiss negotiations of 1938,
Switzerland not only (supposedly) proposed that the stamp be placed in the passports of Ger-
man Jews but actually insisted upon it.
When I questioned him on this statement during a television debate,
132 Marc Perrenoud, histo-
rian and scientific advisor to the Commission, explained however that this sentence should be
interpreted differently, i.e. in the following context: at the end of the German-Swiss negotia-
                                                                            
the project and the comments from the Commission for Judicial Affairs of August 26, 1996, point 22 of the proj-
ect’s article 2; italics mine).
129 Even as balanced and normally serious a periodical as The Economist used the term “Swiss Shame” in, and as a
title for, an editorial.
130 The title of which is “Two Questions”; I will return to this final section of the report.
131 P. 285; italics mine
132 Sunday December 12, 1999, on the first station of the Swiss French-language television, on the program, Droit
de cité.38
tions and after an agreement had been reached with Germany, the latter often delayed marking
the passports of German Jews with a “J”.
133
This delay is a fact, but it is easily understood because, at the time, the Nazis were doing their
best to force German Jews to emigrate. It was therefore not in the German authorities’ interest
to apply this measure in a timely manner. With unmarked passports, German Jews could enter
Switzerland with no special form of authorisation, or at least their chances were relatively
good. It is therefore understandable that Switzerland “insisted”, after the German-Swiss
agreement had been signed, that the Germans uphold their part of the accord they had just
signed. This is however not what most readers would have understood from the report.
...and as a result
As demonstrated by most articles published in reaction to the report’s publication, practically
everyone, abroad and maybe a little less so in Switzerland, remains convinced today that the
specific “J” stamp formula was a sign of infamy that Swiss negotiators had proposed to the
Nazis, and had even insisted upon it. Thus, the report did nothing to dispel this myth and, in
fact, worked to entrench it even further in public opinion.
A “decisive” charge...
Having diluted or “finessed” the issue of the “J” stamp’s origins, the report then presents, on
several occasions, the charge which it considers to be decisive – thus, for example:
(...) The initiative and dynamics that led to the discriminatory marking came from the Swiss
side
134 (...) The fact is that Germany gave in to Switzerland’s insistence on marking the pass-
ports of German and (former) Austrian “emigrants”.
135
... but hardly decisive in reality
This fact is effectively established, but it raises the question as to why Switzerland had to put
Germany under pressure. The report contains all the necessary information about this, but its
meaning and implications are never worked out. The following are samples of this informa-
tion, taken from the report. These long citations are necessary in order to highlight – or remind
the reader of – the situation in which Switzerland  found itself at the time:
Following Germany’s annexation of Austria [ in March 1938] , 5,500 to 6,500 people took ref-
uge in Switzerland, causing the number of refugees on the Confederation’s territory to climb
to an estimated total of between 10,000 and 12,000 people.
136 [I.e., the number of refugees
suddenly doubled].
On June 2, 1938, The General Consul of Switzerland in Vienna noted [in a report sent to
Bern] that, since the middle of May, “the German authorities are working systematically to
drive the Jews out as soon as they have complied with their financial obligations to the coun-
try.” The Germans even infiltrated Jews across the Swiss border [!]. On top of this, new per-
                        
133 See p. 84 of the report.
134 P. 82.
135 P. 80, n. 35.
136 P. 83.39
secutions were instituted, while in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary [i.e. the other coun-
tries bordering Austria], the authorities restricted the admission of refugees. In Italy, as in
Sweden, Belgium, and France, obstacles to their arrival were growing. In July 1938, the Evian
Conference’s failure demonstrated the intense reluctance on all sides to do anything for the
victims of the Nazis, whose discriminatory measures were multiplying. This development
worsened the situation of Switzerland. Moreover, at the end of an inspection tour in Basel and
Bern in August, 1938, Lord Duncannon, of the [ League of Nations]  High Commission for
Refugees from Germany, stated that Switzerland had done everything possible for the refu-
gees and that other members of the League of Nations should give it some relief by accepting
to take some in as well.
137
In fact, the reactions from other governments, in Europe and elsewhere, heightened the Swiss
authorities’ concerns and made them feel more comfortable [ sic]  about their own restrictive
decisions. While Italy adopted a set of anti-Semitic laws in September 1938, the French
authorities were multiplying restrictions and tightening regulations as early as April 1938,
which were then upheld by statutory order on November 12, 1938. Because of its geographi-
cal position (...), the Swiss Confederation was on the front line.
138
Switzerland under intense pressure
Faced with this situation, in particular the attitude of almost all other governments, Switzer-
land was indeed “on the front line”, because German citizens and soon the (former) Austrians
turned German citizens were able – following an agreement that went back to 1926 – to cross
the common border without a visa by simply presenting a German passport. Due to its geo-
graphical location, Switzerland was thus at risk of becoming the main, if not actually the sole,
haven for the multitude of Jews who were trying to escape Nazi persecution and who were
even actively pushed out by the Nazi authorities, the latter wanting to “rid themselves” of the
Jews, but not (yet) to exterminate them.
This being so, it is understandable, and it was natural, for Switzerland to attempt to protect
itself in one way or another. It is just as natural that it would put Germany under pressure to
mark the passports of would-be emigrants, a fact that the report does not emphasise or does
not use to draw the logical and necessary conclusions.
139
If history could be rewritten…
However, it is quite clear today – as it should have been at the time – that Switzerland could
have, and obviously should have, acted in this affair as it had initially intended, i.e. differently.
On August 10, 1938 (the critical phase of German-Swiss negotiations took place in Septem-
ber), the Federal Council denounced, as a precaution, the 1926 mutual agreement abolishing
                        
137 P. 76.
138 P. 81.
139 On page 77, the report states that “(...) The steps taken by Switzerland with the German authorities which led to
the ‘J’ stamp go back to April 1938”, which could be taken as an indication that it was Switzerland which had
initiated these negotiations. Regarding this, I will simply reiterate what I wrote in my last book (op.cit., p. 53, n.
26), on the authority of the Ludwig report (p. 124, letter m), namely that it is unclear which side initiated the nego-
tiations, and in any case the issue is hardly relevant as both sides were in constant contact.40
the requirement of a visa to cross the common border. Shortly prior to this, Swiss negotiators
had proposed that a distinctive sign (Vermerk) be placed in the passports of all German candi-
dates for definitive emigration, Jews and non-Jews alike. The exact proposal was as fol-
lows: 
140
On August 22, 1938, at the request of Bern, the Swiss Legation in Berlin submitted the out-
line of an agreement to the Auswärtiges Amt
141 by means of the following exchange of notes
[the coming citation is therefore a draft of an agreement proposed by the Swiss side]: “In or-
der to avoid that Switzerland should find itself obliged to enforce a complete and absolutely
essential control of the entry of German emigrants by requiring visas in all German passports,
we agree to the following: For ‘Aryan’ persons whose return to Germany is prohibited,
142 as
well as for ‘non-Aryans’, German passports will only be issued after the responsible German
passport office has entered the following note on the first page of the passport : ‘To cross the
Swiss border, a visa issued by a Swiss consulate is necessary’.”
Suppose for an instant that Switzerland had insisted on and succeeded in having its proposal
accepted and that, instead of a letter “J”, the passports of German Jews and all other emigra-
tion candidates had been marked on the first page with the following stamp (in German, of
course):
To cross the Swiss border, a visa issued
 by a Swiss Consulate is required
If this had been the case, it is highly unlikely that Switzerland would be criticised today, al-
though the actual effect of this alternative stamp would have been exactly the same for the
refugees.
143 The error, if not the fault, was therefore in accepting the German counter-proposal
of the “J” stamp and not persevering in the original proposition. Better yet, the visa obligation
should simply have been reinstated, as England did in the same circumstances, thereby allow-
ing the influx of refugees to be controlled: a measure that had become indispensable and
would have been entirely acceptable from a national and international legal perspective.
144 As
we know, it was the Federal Council that, acting in last resort, unanimously accepted the
agreement that included the German counter-proposal, in spite of the reservations and insistent
objections of Heinrich Rothmund, the principal Swiss negotiator.
It should be added that this error, or fault, was made in the very critical international context
the report describes in its introduction, but does not reintroduce at this juncture. More than
sixty years later, it is essential to accurately portray this context.
145
                        
140 Report, p.78.
141 The German Foreign Office.
142 In other words, socialists, communists and other opponents to Hitler’s regime.
143 In his recent and remarkable work (Freedom from Fear, Oxford UP, 1999), historian David Kennedy mentions
(p. 399) that American citizens who, during the Spanish civil war, wanted to fight with the International Brigades
had to travel with an American passport marked: “Not valid for travel in Spain”. Another example: American
passports issued in 1968 carried the following warning: “Not valid for travel to, in or through Communist con-
trolled portions of China, Korea, Viet-Nam - or to, in or through Cuba”. (The bold print as in an original copy in
my possession).
144 See W. Kälin’s legal opinion as discussed at the beginning of this text.
145 The three following paragraphs are taken from my last book, op.cit., pp. 53-4.41
The international context of the time
First of all, the German-Swiss negotiations of 1938 took place nearly three years before the
start of the Holocaust, when no one in Switzerland or elsewhere (Germany included) could
have imagined what would eventually come to pass. Of course, everyone knew that German
and formerly Austrian Jews were being persecuted in ways that were generally barbaric, odi-
ous and rapacious. It was also known that the Reich was trying to expel them through all pos-
sible means. However, to think that the Reich would eventually resort to the systematic exter-
mination of the Jews was a leap that nobody made at the time. Almost no one, the Swiss
authorities included, took heed of what Hitler had promised the Jews in Mein Kampf.
Secondly, the negotiations also took place just before the pogrom of November 9-10, 1938,
(the Kristalnacht or “night of broken glass”) which finally revealed, in a striking manner, that
Nazi anti-Semitism was more than just a temporary aberration and which marked a turning
point. Here is what a historian has written on the subject
146:
At the rise of Hitler [ in 1933] , the Jews completely underestimated the danger. Some believed
that the new regime would not last, while others thought that the Führer had too much political
savvy to turn the powerful foreign Jewish lobbies against him, finally others were convinced
that the Nazis would come to need them at some point (...) This naïve confidence is demon-
strated by the fact that in 1934-35, 10,000 out of the 16,000 Jews who had left Germany, re-
turned home. It was not until 1938 – after the “Kristalnacht” (…) – that they understood that
no hope was left.
Thirdly, the crucial phase of the German-Swiss negotiations took place during the
“Sudeten crisis”, at a time (September 1938) when Europe was literally on the brink of war. In
addition, the Federal Council accepted the “J” stamp agreement just after the Munich agree-
ment (September 29, 1938) in which the two great European democracies threw up a white
flag to Hitler, whom, it appeared, no one wanted to resist in any way.
The effects of the “J” stamp on German Jews
With regard to the actual effects the “J” stamp had on German Jews who wanted to emigrate,
here is what the report’s press release had to say: 
147
The “J” stamp made emigration to other countries more difficult or even impossible for Ger-
man Jews.
In the same vein, the following is a paragraph to be found on the all-important last page of the
report: 
148
The introduction of the “J” stamp in 1938 made it more difficult for Jews living in the Third
Reich to emigrate. Without Swiss pressure [nota bene], the passports would not have been
stamped until later, perhaps not at all. This would have made it less difficult for refugees to
                        
146 Jean-Jacques Langendorf in (p. 87) Fricker et al., La Suisse face à l’empire américain, Geneva , Georg, 1997.
See also M.-A. Charguéraud, Tous coupables? Les démocraties occidentales et les communautés religieuses face à
la détresse juive, 1933-1940, Paris and Geneva, Editions Cerf & Labor et Fides, 1998, pp. 140 et seq.
147 P. 4.
148 P. 285.42
find a country willing to accept them. In any case, many had no intention of settling defini-
tively in Switzerland. Without the “J” stamp, many victims of National Socialism would have
been able to escape persecution through Switzerland or another country.
Debatable speculations
The first sentence (“The introduction of the ‘J’ stamp in 1938 made it more difficult for Jews
living in the Third Reich to emigrate”) is quite questionable. At the time, all other countries
and official entities (with some rare exceptions, such as the “International Settlement” in
Shanghai) carefully controlled immigration, paying particularly close attention to the Jews.
Visas were required almost everywhere and to obtain a visa one had to provide all sorts of in-
formation including, undoubtedly in most cases, religious affiliation.
149
Moreover, the report indicates that
150
On August 17 [1938], the “Second [ German]  Decree on Carrying Out the Law on the Chang-
ing of Family Names and First Names” mandated “Israel” and “Sara” as first names for Jews.
German Jewish asylum-seeking refugees were therefore identifiable as Jewish, with or without
the “J” stamp. It should be noted that the German-Swiss agreement was signed on September
29, 1938, and the German edict on the “J” stamp was issued on October 5.
151 The German
decree for the identical and obligatory first names of Jews therefore preceded the German-
Swiss agreement.
152
The second sentence (“Without Swiss pressure, the passports would not have been stamped
until later, perhaps not at all”) ignores the fact that, at almost the same time as Bern, Stock-
holm began negotiations with the Reich, and with similar objectives: to protect the country
from a massive influx of German Jewish refugees while avoiding a comprehensive visa re-
quirement for all bearers of German passports.
153 At the end of these negotiations, soon after
those with Switzerland, Sweden adopted the formula from the German-Swiss agreement and,
on October 27, 1938, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs signed a directive making the
“J” stamp part and parcel of Swedish foreign policy toward German refugees.
154
                        
149 Those who have gone through the American immigration process, such as myself, know just how curious the
authorities can be. Everything and anything is asked, and must be answered.
150 In its annex 1 (“Chronology”), p. 294.
151 Ibid.
152 This raises the question as to why the Swiss negotiators, who must have been aware of this name regulation, did
not realise that it alone would have achieved their objective. Maybe they felt that, during the border control proc-
ess, first names were more likely to slip past police inspection than a large stamp. It should be noted that, according
to A. Lasserre, op.cit., p. 57, the Reich ordered, on August 15, 1938, that all Austrian passports had to be replaced
by German passports. This was therefore before the crucial phase of German-Swiss negotiations, which took place
in September, so that the “special” problem of former Austrian passports was by then a non-issue.
153 According to a letter to the editor, signed Heinz Albers, Zurich, and which refers to the Ludwig report as well as
the work of A.J. Sherman (this letter appeared in the NZZ of 12.22.1999), the Reich had already proposed to
England, on April 27, 1938, i.e. well before the German-Swiss negotiations, to put a distinctive mark in German
passports for emigrants (Jewish and non-Jewish). England refused and resolved the problem by requiring visas.
154 Swedish policy will be examined in detail below.43
If Switzerland had not accepted the German proposal of the specific “J” stamp formula, would
Germany have put forward this formula in its negotiations with Sweden, and would the
Swedes have accepted it? This is possible, but unlikely. In this hypothesis, Sweden would have
probably adopted the alternate solution agreed upon in the German-Swiss agreement (for ex-
ample, a Vermerk as explained above). In any case, this question is of little import in this con-
text, considering that the obligatory first names for German Jews made them identifiable as
such at the frontier or, even more so, during the emigration procedures.
It follows that the final sentence of this paragraph (“Without the ‘J’ stamp, many victims of
National Socialism would have been able to escape persecution through Switzerland or an-
other country”) must be considered as a rather unwarranted speculation. It is much more rea-
sonable to assume that the “J” stamp actually did not have much effect on the problems en-
countered by German and (former) Austrian Jews who tried to emigrate, although this does not
lessen its discriminatory nature. For them, the real obstacles were mostly finding a long-term
host country, obtaining a visa or some other form of official entry authorisation and perhaps,
for many, a lack of, or insufficient, financial means.
In this respect, it must be underlined that the majority of German Jews (around 75%) and for-
merly Austrian Jews (around 73%) somehow managed to leave the Reich in time and therefore
escaped the Holocaust, which struck above all the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe; see
table 5 at the end of this chapter.
155 [ For those who might find these statistics shocking – and
their horror is truly unbearable – I would like to point out that they come from The Encyclo-
paedia of the Holocaust.
156]
Most curious is that nothing in the body of the report itself supports these speculations about
the effects of the “J” stamp on the emigration possibilities for German Jews. In fact, they only
appear in the general conclusion and press release. We can easily imagine what happened:
these speculations, completely devoid of reality, were probably inserted at the prompting of
one or several members of the Commission, but were never researched by the staff. Did the
Commission intend to maximise the dramatic impact of its report? In any case, it is quite clear
that here they tried not to “protest too much”, but to “prove too much”.
                        
155 Report, pp. 102-3: “Around 235,000 Jews had left Germany before the war began, as well as more than 10,000
artists and intellectuals and another 30,000 who had fled because of their political activities. A total of 7,631
refugees passed through the Basel train station between the months of March and May 1933 alone. For them,
Switzerland was primarily a transit country, since the Swiss Federal Council had decreed the transit principle for
Jews in March, 1933, and guaranteed only recognised political refugees residence of greater length.” According to
the data for Germany in table 5 below, 424,500 German Jews escaped the Holocaust, of a pre-war community of
566,000.
156 Obtained via the “Simon Wiesenthal Centre” in Los Angeles. See the documents entitled: “36 Questions About
the Holocaust”, which can be found at http://www.wiesenthal.com/resource/36quest1.htm. I arrange the countries
differently than in the original and add some missing European countries (United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland,
Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland). I calculated the weighed averages using a little algebra. The origi-
nal document mentions (question 3) that if the Jewish victims of the Holocaust numbered a little less than six
million, the non-Jewish civilian victims (Gypsies, Polish intellectuals, Serbs, underground members in various
occupied countries, German opponents, homosexuals, etc.) were almost as numerous, which is less well known,
although it has been disputed (see Peter Novick’s latest book).44
After this critical examination of the two central points of the report, I will now investigate
several other issues that are treated or appear in it, but are not necessarily of the same para-
mount importance.
Table  5
European Countries: Percentage Estimates of the Pre-war Jewish Population
who Fell to the Holocaust, and Absolute Numbers of Victims
Country Percentage Absolute Numbers
Western and Northern Europe
a
     Netherlands
     Luxembourg
     Norway
     Belgium
     Austria
     Germany
     France
     Denmark
     Finland
              Weighted average
     United Kingdom
     Ireland
     Iceland
     Sweden
     Switzerland
Central, Eastern and Southern
              Europe
     Poland
     Greece
     Lithuania
     Yugoslavia
     Slovakia
     Latvia
     Hungary
     Bohemia-Moravia
     Romania
     Estonia



























































     Italy
           Weighted average
     Bulgaria
     Turkey
     Spain
     Portugal


















Total I+II  5,860,129
d
                     a/ Including Germany and Austria        d/ The source indicates a total of
                     b/ 0.3%                                                      5,860,000 victims, rounded up to 6 million
                     c/ Subject to exceptions
                        (e.g. dual nationals)                               Source: see text
3.  Other issues in the report
3.1 How to enter Switzerland: legally or “illegally”?
In addition to the rejections of “illegal” refugees, there is also the fact that of 24,100 visa re-
quests registered between spring 1938 and November 1944 by asylum candidates at various
Swiss offices (consulates, etc.), the Federal Alien Police refused 14,500 (60%) and accepted
9,600 (40%).
157 It is probable that among those whose request was refused, some later tried
their chances at the border anyway. Therefore they would be included in the number of so-
called ‘illegal’ refugees who were either admitted or rejected.
158
In general, these refusals of legal entry requests are interpreted
159 as having had an additional
deterring influence on potential asylum candidates, in conjunction with rejections. What is
there to say on this subject?
Let us imagine that, against all probability, none of those whose visa request was refused at-
tempted thereafter to enter Switzerland “illegally”; that all of these visa requests, accepted or
rejected, were made during the war; and finally that all of the 9,600 people who received visas
actually came to Switzerland. In these conditions, the average admittance probability is 61%
per legal or illegal attempt at a consulate or at the border.
160 For reasons I have just mentioned,
double counting for example, this estimate is most likely too low. Therefore, chances remain
roughly two-out-of-three per (legal or “illegal”) attempt even taking visa requests into account.
3.2 Why were there not more asylum candidates?
Considering the rather high admittance chances for illegal refugees as presented above (table 4
and graph 3), the question arises as to why more – possibly many more – people in Europe,
                        
157 Report p. 21. I do not know of any data concerning the composition and the timing of these accepted and re-
fused requests. It would be interesting to know more on the subject.
158 Mr. Guido Koller kindly confirmed this for me in a telephone conversation.
159 For example in Koller, op.cit., passim.
160 (51,129+9,600)/(51,129+24,500+24,100) = 61%. According to the report (table on p. 24), the total of 51,129
accepted refugees does not include legal refugees. It should be noted that that the total given by the report is used
here and not André Lasserre’s higher number; see above.46
Jews in particular, did not spontaneously attempt to obtain refuge in Switzerland by going to
the border without entry papers. It is impossible to give an exact number or even an approxi-
mate estimate of people (Jewish and other) who, due to various forms of persecution or for
other reasons (draft into the S.T.O., for example), would have wanted to seek asylum in Swit-
zerland during the war, but this “reservoir” of refugees surely included hundreds of thousands,
if not millions of people.
161
Three primary reasons
An initial response to this question is that reaching the frontier was hardly easy (travel diffi-
culties in wartime, entry authorisations, etc.) or safe (frontier regions surrounding Switzerland
as well as the other side of the border were under close surveillance
162) or affordable (some
guides or “helpers” charged exorbitant fees
163).
Secondly, the trip to the Swiss border was nevertheless much more feasible for inhabitants of
Western Europe (France, Belgium, Holland, Italy) than for those of Eastern Europe, even if the
former generally had to cross Nazi-occupied areas. However, if we take the example of Polish
Jews, or the many who had been deported to Poland, they would have had to cross the Reich
itself (Germany and/or Austria), which was much more difficult and dangerous.
164 In fact, the
vast majority of persecuted people, Jews in particular, were from or in Eastern Europe – see
above.
165
Thirdly, as shown above, admittance probabilities fluctuated greatly according to time, place
and refugee category. This alone would have had a deterring effect. If the admittance chances
had been two out of three (per attempt) at all times and border points, and for everyone alike,
this would have been more favourable than the actual situation where the chances were on
average two out of three, but fluctuated in said three dimensions, and also in a largely unpre-
dictable manner. In more technical terms, familiar to economists and statisticians, we must
take into consideration not only the first “moment” of  the distribution (its mean or expected
value) but also the second (its dispersion or variance). Assuming risk aversion, which is the
most common attitude, the higher the variance for a given mean, the more effective the deter-
                        
161 While the Reich prohibited, from 1941, the emigration of Jews from its territory, there were a large number of
asylum candidates in Western Europe. For example, alone in France’s so-called free zone, there were 170,000
foreigners (mostly Spanish Republicans) that the Vichy regime considered as undesirable, and whom it encouraged
to leave.
162 For example, see Lasserre, op.cit., p.172.
163 For example, ibid., p.159.
164 The passage through Italy was relatively feasible for the inhabitants of the Balkans, at least till the German
occupation of Italy. This is how refugees from Yugoslavia managed to reach Switzerland.
165 After having read and commented on an initial version of this text, André Lasserre wrote the following to me,
“The number of potential asylum candidates progressively decreased from the beginning of the war, or from 1940.
The Germans systematically purged the entire Reich of Jews so that the country would be judenrein. To this end
they created and filled the Polish ghettos before emptying them, at a later stage, into the death camps (…) One
could escape from Brussels to Switzerland, but not from the prison-ghetto of Warsaw.”47
ring effect. I will return to this point in the section dealing with the “credibility” of Swiss pol-
icy.
Plus an information problem, and a handicap
Finally, there could have been an information problem: while admittance probabilities can be
estimated today more or less accurately, it is possible that they were commonly underestimated
at the time. Yet, there are also indications to the contrary.
166 As for the majority of Jewish
refugees, they suffered from yet another handicap: in contrast with some other refugees (e.g.
the Dutch and Belgians, including Jewish nationals from these countries) who could count on
the support of their authorities (in this case the Dutch and Belgian exiled governments and
their legations in Bern),
167 Jews from other countries did not have this resource, and the same
was true for those who were stateless or who had been arbitrarily stripped of their citizenship.
And if Switzerland had completely opened its borders.....
These four reasons, of which only the third is directly linked to Switzerland, sufficiently ex-
plain why the total number of asylum candidates (admitted, rejected or whose visa request was
refused) was not larger, despite the relatively high average probabilities of admittance.
It would have been an entirely different situation however if Switzerland had completely
opened its borders from the very beginning of the war and had kept them open for the duration.
By definition, the admittance probabilities for such a hypothetical scenario would have been,
everywhere and at all times, 100% with a zero variance. There would have been absolutely no
deterring signals on the part of Switzerland and, as word of this would have spread quickly, it
would have produced a massive and uncontrollable influx at the borders.
An explanation of the “official line” and the question of its credibility
As I have mentioned several times, the official rhetoric was often harsh and sometimes very
harsh in regard to refugee policy, particularly during the first half of the war. The report con-
centrates on this official line, as does a large part of the literature (scientific and less scientific)
on the subject. As a matter of fact, some declarations, instructions and correspondence of the
time are rather repugnant when read today, that is in retrospect.
Were all of the authorities at the time inhuman, devoid of pity or compassion? In some cases,
this was certainly true, if only due to the great diversity of the human psyche.
There is however a more general and rational explanation for the harshness of the official line;
an explanation based on a branch of modern economic theory: the signalling model in game
theory.
168 To understand this model in this context, let us suppose that instead of being severe,
as it was most of the time, the official policy had been open, compassionate and generous in its
declared principles as in all other overt or explicit manifestations, i.e. in all of the “signals”
                        
166 It seems that some refugees believed that they would be admitted with no difficulty.
167 On this subject se Koller, op.cit., p. 40 and Lasserre, op.cit., p. 122.
168 Refer to the works of Michael Spence, David Krebs and others. For a good summary, see The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics.48
sent out for the benefit of both the Swiss and foreign publics, particularly any potential asylum
candidates.
If this had been the case, news  would have travelled quickly, in Switzerland and abroad, even
under wartime circumstances. This would have been soon followed by a strong influx of asy-
lum-seeking refugees amounting to a mass migration. One does not need an in-depth knowl-
edge of game theory to imagine such a scenario. Aware of this, the authorities rationally chose
to disseminate, near and far, a hard official line. The real question is whether or not this line
was too hard, or harder than necessary for the given objectives. Were the signals adequate or
too strong? I have no response to this question because it would require one or several
“counter-factual” experiments that would surpass the limits of reason.
Be that as it may, we have here a rational and founded explanation of the authorities’ official
policy. This explanation is based on logical principles, not the oversimplifications that tend to
arise so often when it comes to explaining human behaviour (“good guys” vs. “bad guys”). Is
this explanation too forgiving? This is not the point, or at least it should not be the point for
those researchers and specialists who take Fernand Braudel seriously when he urged that “The
historian should not judge but explain and understand” to which he added “We no longer want
to hear about the Court of history, with a capital C ”.
However, one could ask whether it would have been possible to constantly maintain a hard
line while at the same time pursuing an equally constant generous practice at the border; in
other words, a practice that allowed for high admittance rates, which was the case, but with a
low or zero variance. An initial response to this question has already been provided: a low or
zero variance would have led to a much greater, even massive and thus uncontrollable, influx
of refugees. Another response relies on the notion of “credibility” used in the modern analysis
of economic policy.
169 If practice toward refugees had been constant, with a low or zero vari-
ance, news would have travelled and the hard line of the official policy would have lost all
credibility. The chapter on official Swiss refugee policy is therefore closed with this rational
and founded explanation.
3.3 Switzerland as a “transit” country
The fact that Switzerland saw itself as a “transit country” for refugees comes up often in the
report
170 – in reference to the so-called corridor doctrine or policy adopted in the early 1930s
and which was supported by almost unanimous consensus in the country.
171 Yet, the question
of whether or not this general principle was justified is not discussed in the report.
Could Switzerland have adopted another policy, for example to be a country of considerable
and permanent immigration? 
172 Or again, should the country have opened its borders fully,
                        
169 See, for example, Olivier Blanchard, Macroeconomics, Prentice Hall, 1997, 2
nd ed., pp.177-80.
170 As well as on pp.15, 40, 48, 97, 102, 159, 354-55.
171 P. 354 of the report: “Even those who dared to criticise the manner in which the refugee issue was handled,
primarily in the socialist newspaper, Tagwacht, did not question the transit doctrine”.
172 As it was adopted after the war, in an increasing manner, but in very different economic circumstances. Let us
not forget that with a foreign population of approximately 20% (~25% of the work force), Switzerland is, at the
moment and relative to its population, the European country with the highest immigration (if we exclude extremely49
thus in fact doing away with them, and admit – before and during the war – all candidates on a
more temporary basis, regardless of their number (which in these circumstances surely would
have been very high)?
If the report does not raise these questions, it is because they would have necessarily led to the
issue of the limit to the number of refugees that Switzerland could have possibly admitted in
1933-1945, either permanently as a country of immigration, or temporarily as a provisional
refuge. As it would not have been possible, under penalty of a loss of credibility (!), for the
report to argue for limitless admission, it passes over this issue without, or with very little,
commentary (see below).
It is an undeniable although tragic fact that admitting everyone would have been physically
impossible.
173 I have yet to encounter an opposing opinion when this question is asked or dealt
with in an explicit manner. Since establishing some sort of limit was inevitable, and if the ad-
ditional and essential issue of dynamics in this type of situation is taken into consideration (the
more refugees admitted, the more numerous they become
174), there would have necessarily
been rejections and consequently terrible human drama, difficult though it may be to say or to
face this fact. This would have been particularly true if the limits had been set much higher
than they actually were.
In short, orienting the report’s discussion in this direction would have led to the classic conclu-
sion that, when judged retrospectively, Switzerland probably could have admitted a somewhat
larger number of refugees.
175 However, it would have been simply impossible for the country
to become a more or less permanent haven for the hundreds of thousands, if not millions of
potential refugees in Europe at the time. Practically all of those who have studied this subject
concur with this conclusion. However, the report does not investigate the question or even
mention it, perhaps because doing so would have been incompatible with the report’s utterly
negative judgments.
176
                                                                            
small countries such as Luxembourg).
173 It seems that at least some refugees were aware of this: “I certainly understand that Switzerland is not able to
take in all the refugees and that it is forced to turn some back (…)”, letter from Frédéric G. to the Swiss legation to
Vichy, September 10, 1942 (report p.148).
174I will not return to this issue of dynamics as it is discussed in my book. (op.cit., pp. 68-69). The chapter dedi-
cated to this subject begins with the following sentence: “When the second Bergier report is published, it will be
interesting to see if it recognises the important problem of dynamics which is inherent to any refugee policy”.
Today, I can state that the report did not recognise this issue, or comment on it at all. – It should be added that the
deterring effects associated with the odds for admission and their variance, as described above, is another, separate
issue than this problem of dynamics. A higher admittance probability or a reduction in its variance would have
produced a greater influx, in and of themselves.
175 How many? In my recent book, I – perhaps recklessly – put forth the hypothesis that the country could have
accepted approximately 80,000 more, i.e. more than twice the number of rejections and the number of those whose
visa requests were refused; op.cit., p.68. Today, I would be more cautious on this point – see my more recent work.
176 The press release illustrates this tendency to judge and condemn: “Taking round figures, we can say that 51,000
refugees, of which – in spite of all – 20,000 Jews, were admitted into Switzerland during the war” (p.5; italics
supplied). The words “in spite of all” are revealing. Moreover, it is not stated that these “51,000 refugees” only
consisted of so-called illegal refugees, which means that the more numerous refugees in other categories are ig-
nored.50
However, on one or two occasions, the report indirectly touches upon the issue of the number
of refugees the country could admit, e.g.: 
177
There is no indication that opening the border might have provoked an invasion by the Axis,
or caused insurmountable economic difficulties.
Notice the lack of qualifier: opening the border “completely”, or “more completely” than
it already was? No one knows.
Or still:
178
By creating additional barriers at the border, Swiss officials helped the Nazi regime achieve
its goals, whether intentionally or not.
Regarding these “additional” barriers, they must mean above and beyond the difficulties en-
countered when trying to reach the Swiss border itself (see above). Once again, the text does
not say if the “Swiss authorities” should have created fewer barriers, or none at all.
In all of the report, the above sentence incited the greatest number of critical reactions, which
is why I will return to it below.
3.4 A transit country – but to where?
To declare that the country can be, or wants to be, a transit country only is not enough to make
it so; other countries would have to concur by providing long-term or ultimate asylum.
As demonstrated above, these asylum possibilities were anything but easy before and at the
beginning of the war, but they did exist. After all, as I stated before, three-quarters of the Ger-
man and Austrian Jews fortunately managed to reach safety, primarily overseas, while there
was still time.
On this last point, a rather unknown fact which the report does not emphasise is that emigra-
tion from Switzerland was possible till the fall of 1942, i.e. till the occupation of the southern
zone in France on November 11, or at least till shortly before this date.
179 This means that par-
ticularly from June to early November 1942 – critical months because the “final solution” was
being implemented then in Nazi-controlled Western Europe – there still was a possible escape
route from Switzerland: the Geneva “escape hatch”, Vichy France, the Iberian Peninsula, and
from there overseas. Therefore the main obstacle, but not the only one, was obtaining an im-
migration visa or other authorisation, particularly for the USA, which was generally the desti-
nation of choice.
180
                        
177 P. 285.
178 Ibid.
179 See table 6 below. When I say that the report does not emphasise this fact, I am thinking of sentences such as the
following, which was already quoted (p.15): “However, beginning in 1942 [ sic]  when the Nazi mass murder policy
was in full operation, deportations from France had begun, and Vichy France had been occupied, Switzerland was
the last hope for those able to reach its borders”. As I have just pointed out, occupation of Vichy France took place
on November 11, 1942, in other words, almost at the end of the year.
180 The situation was rather different for would-be refugees in occupied France, Belgium, etc. While reaching the
southern French zone was not easy for them, it was still more or less possible. It was easier to leave from Switzer-51
The report does provide the necessary numerical data confirming this escape route through
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            170                     85
          1'201                   100
            148                     16
          1'519                     66
 32       21
    566       47
 30       20
    628       41
The report also shows in various passages that Swiss authorities did their best to ensure that
refugees who wanted to emigrate would be able to do so: 
183
Hoping to make it possible for refugees to find asylum overseas, [ Carl Bruggmann] , the Swiss
Minister [ i.e. ambassador to the U.S.] , contacted the State Department in Washington [in
September 1942]. Bringing up the issue of the sheer number of Jewish fugitives [ in Switzer-
land] , which went beyond the economy’s supportive capacity, and brandishing the threat of a
German forced repatriation order, he hoped to obtain an increase in the [ U.S. immigration]
quota. To Brugmann’s great surprise, the American side answered that the United States had
already been very generous and had accepted 200,000 immigrants since the beginning of the
war
184 (...) “If the USA could help Switzerland by providing a greater number of visas (566 in
1941, 30 in 1942), it would be possible [for us] to accept more refugees.”
186 [This last sen-
                                                                            
land thanks to the Geneva “escape hatch”, and maybe from Italy too.
181 I have put the numerical data from p.97 of the report into a table format. These indications however contradict
what one finds on page 180 of the report (another example of internal inconsistency):  “The Swiss Union of Jewish
Mutual Help Committees (VSJF) organised continued migration for nearly 3,800 Jewish refugees between 1933
and the beginning of the war (…) Most of these projects ended abruptly when the war began. Although further
migration during the war was illusory in any practical sense, refugees were by no means released from the ‘transit
principle’ (…)” (italics supplied). It should also be noted that the report states on page 102: “(…) With American
entry into the war in late 1942, the possibility of emigrating overseas disappeared as well”, which is again in con-
tradiction with the figures given by the report and found in table 6 (30 visas granted by the USA between January
and September 1942 for people “leaving Switzerland by official convoys”). However, it is true that after the USA’s
involuntary entry into the war following the Japanese attack on December 17, 1941, American authorities became
even more restrictive than before in regard to immigration. Moreover, safe possibilities for crossing the Atlantic
became increasingly rare and thus more expensive, as they depended primarily on a small number of vessels under
flags of neutral countries (Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American ships). This explains why, according to the
above table, there were no more than 16 departures per month in the first three quarters of 1942.
182 Source indicated by the report “Statistics on the destination countries for refugees leaving Switzerland by offi-
cial convoys from October 1940”.
183 P. 97, including n.108 for the sentence quoted.
184 Bruggmann was justifiably surprised, as the figure of 200,000 seems exaggerated, if not far-fetched. Perhaps the
American representative was referring to all of the immigrants to the USA starting from well before the war, or
perhaps he said the true number and Mr. Bruggmann misunderstood. Henry Spira, op.cit. p. 319 indicates that the
USA accorded asylum to only 15,000 Jews during the war.
186 Italics mine.52
tence is found in Mr. Bruggmann’s directives from Bern]  (...) In an attempt to head off poten-
tial criticism, Rothmund had research done on the British government’s attitude toward refu-
gees and on the obstacles leading to the death of refugees who attempted to settle in Pales-
tine.
185
The report also recounts Paul Billieux’s intervention, during a September 1942 special session
of the Swiss National Council [ Lower House]  on the issue of refugee policy.
187 Mr. Billieux,
who “was aware of the situation at Porrentruy”,
188 proposed that “we should have the Red
Cross ask the USA, etc., to accept more refugees.”
189 This shows that, as late as September
1942, immigration to countries across the Atlantic was still considered physically possible,
provided these countries granted the necessary authorisations.
As pointed out above, Spain and Portugal were rather generous in granting authorisations for
transit through their territories, as long as it was only for transit:
Legal transit through Spain and Portugal was restricted almost exclusively to holders of visas
for countries outside Europe (...) Only a few refugees were refused entry at the Spanish bor-
der, which thus enabled Spain to serve as a transit country to over 40,000 persons leaving
Nazi Europe between 1940 and 1944.
190
As for transportation across France, the report says the following:
[Swiss] negotiators succeeded in inserting into the German-Swiss agreement the right to have
trains carrying emigrants transit through France in the direction of the Iberian Peninsula.
191
Therefore, it is clear that the main reason why only a small number of refugees, Jews in par-
ticular, were able to emigrate from Switzerland before the country was completely encircled by
the Axis in November, 1942, has to do with the restrictive immigration policies of countries
across the Atlantic. If these policies had been different, it would have been “possible [for
Switzerland] to accept more refugees”, to quote the instructions from Bern to the Swiss Min-
ister [ ambassador]  in Washington. As the report accurately states, for many of these refugees
“Switzerland would not have been the final goal of their flight”
192, as their greatest wish was
surely to find a safer refuge than exposed Switzerland.
3.5 Anti-Semitism and Überfremdung
193
                        
185 It would be quite interesting to see what this documentation contains, if it still exists.
187 Or, more precisely, during a session of the “radical” (i.e. centre-right) fraction of the Lower House.
188 Paul Billieux was the mayor of Porrentruy from 1939 and a “radical-liberal” member of the Lower House from
1934 to 1943. Due to its location on the French side of the Jura mountains, the Porrentruy region experienced a
strong influx of refugees. See Spira, op.cit., p.301.
189 P. 95.
190 P. 102 including, for the second sentence, note 4. It should be noted that Spain still carried out a significant
number of rejections or admission refusals (as did Portugal, according to H. Spira who says he has proof of it), the
most famous case being that of the German philosopher, Walter Benjamin, who committed suicide rather than face
the Gestapo.
191 P. 52.These convoys were sometimes known as Emigrantenzüge or Israelitenzüge (same page, note 83). The
report does not say which German-Swiss agreement it is referring to; perhaps it is that of spring-summer, 1940.
192 P. 285.
193 I use the German expression, as the translation “overpopulation by and excessive influence of foreigners” is53
In order to explain the restrictive official line of the Swiss authorities, while minimising or
eclipsing the fact that admittance practice was much more liberal and generous, the report pre-
sents the following thesis as stated in its press release:
One of the arguments used to justify the closing of the borders was the problem of food sup-
plies. The sources, however, attest to the fact that neither the pressure coming from abroad,
whether military or political, nor the scarcity of food supplies played a decisive role. The
question therefore emerges as to why Switzerland, despite its knowledge [ of the Holocaust]
and in the absence of any compelling necessity [ sic] , turned back thousands of refugees in the
summer of 1942 and in the following months, and thus became a party to the crimes of the
Nazi regime [ sic!]  by abandoning the refugees to their persecutors (…) As we [ the Bergier
Commission]  see it, anti-Semitism represents a particularly significant reason why the perse-
cution of the Jews was either not given the attention it deserved or, despite knowledge of the
fact, produced no reaction beneficial to the victims (...) Anti-Semitism was embedded in a
population policy which, since the First World war, had been opposed to the country’s Über-
fremdung [ overpopulation by and excessive influence of foreigners]  and in particular to its so-
called Verjudung [ overpopulation by and excessive influence of Jews] .
194
This thesis thus embodies a causal chain, which can be depicted in the following diagram:
Fear of Überfremdung ! anti-Semitism ! inhuman policy toward refugees
The first two elements of this chain need to be examined; the third has already been discussed
(Swiss practice was not inhuman). I will demonstrate that this causal chain is anachronistic
and also, frankly, rather simplistic.
The report dates the origins of the fear of Überfremdung to World War I, which is inaccurate
inasmuch as popular sentiment is concerned.
195 However, it is true from a more general per-
spective that the 1914-18 Urkatastrophe marked the start of Europe’s decline in the twentieth
century, if not its decadence,
196 in much the same way as the Peloponnesian war ushered the
decline of Ancient Greece.
197
Four years of nameless carnage and savage fighting in the mud of the trenches not only deci-
mated an entire generation, but also ravaged the survivors. It was no doubt primarily because
much of European society was so deeply brutalised by World War I that the ensuing years saw
the rise, mostly in the defeated nations, of fascism, communism, eventually Leninism-
Stalinism, Nazism and other more or less conspicuous extremist movements on the far right
and far left.
198 In short, European society between the two wars, and the dominant mentalities
                                                                            
rather too long and cumbersome. No good French translation exists either.
194 P. 4 of the press release; see also p. 45 and forward in the report.
195 Because these fears existed even before 1914; see for example page 675 of Nouvelle histoire de la Suisse et des
Suisses (Payot, Lausanne, second edition in one volume, 1986).
196 See the first chapter of my book, and its sources.
197 The paths of many civilisations are characterised by such breaking points. Another example is the eventually
irreparable defeat of Byzantium by the Turks at the battle of Manzikert in 1071; see the commentaries of Steven
Runciman, A History of the Crusades, Harper, 1951, vol. I, p. 64.
198 Of course, the “heritage” of World War I was not the only factor: the Great Depression of the 1920s and the54
in particular, were a deplorable if not revolting spectacle for those who maintained hope and
faith in democracy as well as sense of decency, humanism and humanitarianism.
The European cesspool
In the 1930s, with the Great Depression, the Nazis’ rise to power, the increasing barbarism of
Italian fascism and other “misfortunes” (which is something of an understatement), it would
hardly be excessive to refer to a European cesspool: a nazi Germany; a fascist Italy; an Eng-
land in the illusory and hazardous grip of pacifism and appeasement; a weakened and demor-
alised France, torn between virulent far-right and far-left movements, and headed from 1936
on by an anti-liberal, anti-bourgeois Popular Front government; a Russia in the throws of the
“communist experiment”
199 ; a drift towards dictatorship in most of the other countries (Po-
land, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Romania, the Baltic countries, etc.) – this was the sombre and
pathetic portrait of most of Europe in this period. A profoundly isolationist and anti-European
America completes the picture.
200
An informed and rational attitude
Under such circumstances, it was a natural, rational, informed and sound reaction if very
many in Switzerland, especially in the German and Italian speaking areas, attempted to dis-
tance themselves more and more from, if not the rest of the world, then the rest of Europe and
particularly the nearby countries, and if in these conditions many Swiss increasingly feared an
eventual Überfremdung of their small and exposed country.
201 The contemporary international
context thus largely explains Switzerland’s withdrawal into itself; the fear and rejection of
foreigners; the unyielding (and thus sometimes rather narrow) patriotism and the vigorous de-
fence of the “Swiss exception” in general and of the Swiss conception of democracy in par-
ticular. Continental Europe at the time was more and more a land of extremists and dictators,
large or small, from both the left and the right. It was therefore quite different from what it is
today, as were the underlying reasons for the fear of Überfremdung. To ignore this fact opens
the doors to unjustifiable and invidious comparisons with today’s situation (i.e. Switzerland’s
current aloofness vis-à-vis the European Union, whether justified or not).
202
It is therefore rather paradoxical that some historians, apparently including those of the Bergier
Commission, who take to retrospectively decrying nazism and fascism (but rarely commu-
                                                                            
1930s also played a decisive role; cf. my book, pp. 20-2.
199 In retrospect, it is very difficult to understand why so many Europeans of the time and most intellectuals in
particular did not instantaneously grasp the true nature of the “Moscow trials” in the mid- and late 1930s, to name
only this one example of what Russian communism really was.
200 On this last point (a “largely anti-European” America), see in particular the eloquent tableau in David Kennedy,
op.cit.
201 Of course, many other Europeans shared this revulsion towards the aberrations and the barbarity of almost all of
Europe. Similarly, obviously not all Americans were isolationist or anti-European.
202 One cannot help but be surprised when reading sentences in the report such as the following: “It has meanwhile
become well-known that the fear of being ‘overrun by foreigners’ (Überfremdungsangst) at a time when the words
‘Jews’ and ‘anti-Semitism’ were associated with Nazi Germany, became a symbol for the taboo [?] subject of anti-
Semitism in Switzerland that is still under-researched”. In my opinion, this example demonstrates a certain adoles-
cent or cheap sociology.55
nism), profess to be shocked and incensed by the aversion toward foreign influences, in par-
ticular those of Europe, demonstrated by many Swiss at the time.
An authentic special case (or Sonderfall)
At the time the country’s people were highly aware of this Swiss singularity, as confirmed by
many accounts. The memories and recollections of those still alive today also attest to this, as
they are often saddened or offended by the lack of understanding demonstrated by some of
today’s self-righteous and virtuous historians. Can we refute these protests from survivors
when they deplore historians who are unable, or simply refuse, to imagine or comprehend the
situation and perceptions of the time and choose to align themselves on the conformist moral-
ity of today’s neo-puritanical “political correctness”? 
203 Anyway, how is it possible to effec-
tively analyse an entire era without attempting to accurately represent and comprehend the
situation? These historians seem to have forgotten, or ignored, the warning from one of their
greatest colleagues, Marc Bloch, who, over fifty years ago, denounced “the obsession with
judgement, which is the satanic enemy of the true social sciences”. (See also the quote from
Fernand Braudel, another great historian, at the beginning of this text.)
The reasons for the “causal chain”
It is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the object of the report’s causal, or rather
pseudo-causal chain is more the Switzerland of today than that of the period in question. One
can wonder whether these historians are not actually attempting, in a more or less conscious
and deliberate manner, to influence current attitudes and policy. From the irreproachable posi-
tion of “anti-anti-Semitism”, they denounce all that can be accused of xenophobia and finish
by pleading the case for all asylum seekers – those of the time, but also indirectly those of to-
day. This is an unfortunate implementation of history for political ends. If there was ever a
field that should remain above all of the quarrels of the present day, it is history, by its defini-
tion and vocation.
Was Switzerland deeply and virulently anti-Semitic?
With regard to anti-Semitism, the report rightly states that it is impossible to measure the de-
gree to which it was then prevalent in Switzerland, as surveys were unknown in the country at
the time. The most likely hypothesis is that of a latent and widespread, but rarely hostile, anti-
Semitism.
204 However, it is excessive to maintain or to suggest that anti-Semitism tainted the
whole of Swiss society. It is difficult to imagine such a prejudice within groups like the social
                        
203 Near the end of his life, André Malraux (1901–1976) reportedly predicted that the twenty-first century “will be
religious, or it will not exist at all”. In light of the current ravages of “political correctness” and the increasing
influence of a new moral orthodoxy, we should probably fear instead that the twenty-first century – the beginning
in any case – will not be religious, but rather … “righteous”.
204 It seems that there was only one case of serious physical violence against a Jew in Switzerland, before and
during the war (the murder of a cattle merchant at Payerne, which it seems had other motivations too). Obviously,
this is one case too many, but the contrast with Germany or even France (the near lynching of Léon Blum in a Paris
street in 1936, for example) is striking.56
democrats, or even within all the various circles of bourgeois society, which was then far from
homogenous or unanimous, in this respect as in others.
205,206
The report also recognises that anti-Semitic sentiments prevailed throughout the rest of the
world at the time, with varying degrees of virulence.  According to surveys, which were al-
ready in use in the United States at the time, more than half of that country’s inhabitants and
almost half the members of Congress openly admitted to anti-Semitic feelings, whereas in
Great Britain and in Italy, the percentages were much lower.
207 Peter Novick has however
pointed out recently that anti-Semitism in the United States was actually rather shallow, which
explains why it disappeared quickly and almost entirely after the war. Much the same was
most probably true of Switzerland too, a point altogether missed by the report.
Moreover, what is basically problematic with the report is its insistence on a direct an une-
quivocal causal link between anti-Semitism and official refugee policy. The latter actually re-
sulted from an entire spectrum of other factors, real or more imaginary, justified or not, and
more of less shared by the population, i.e.: the food situation; 
208 national security; the feeling
of being surrounded and hemmed in on all sides; unemployment and the state of the labor
market; the fear of possible retaliation from the Germans; the fear of Überfremdung (see
above); finally, the feeling that “we already have enough problems” – and implicitly: “without
having to care for all of these refugees”, i.e. a national egoism which ordinarily remains more
or less latent or repressed, but which can surface at times of war, insecurity, hardship, etc.
209
No other possibility but a counter-factual approach
In order to determine the relative importance of anti-Semitism among all of these other factors,
the only method is that of a counter-factual (mental) experiment. In other words, one must ask
what the official refugee policy would have been, for Jews and non-Jews, in the (hypothetical)
absence of anti-Semitic sentiment, maintaining all the other motivations, whether realistic or
not.
Counter-factual experiment cannot, of course, provide results that are as reliable as controlled
laboratory experiments (or at least most of them). In other words, an answer to the above
question can only be speculative, particularly when lacking a formalised and verified model
that could be simulated to that end. For whatever it is worth, my opinion is that official refugee
policy would not have been very different in the (hypothetical) absence of anti-Semitism, pre-
                        
205 In this respect, the report sometimes drifts into generalisations and suggestive formulations, such as: “(…) the
anti-Semitic and xenophobic mentality [was] present at every level of the army (…)” The unaware reader may take
this to mean that all or most members of the army, at all levels, were anti-Semitic.
206 It should be noted that of the 67 accounts that Ken Newman (op.cit.) gathered from Jewish refugees admitted
into Switzerland during the war, not one claimed to have been the victim of anti-Semitic behaviour or remarks.
This clearly conflicts with the hypothesis of a “latent and diffused anti-Semitism”, although memories can be
selective.
207 On this subject, see my book, pp. 27,  42-3, 57 (n. 39), 71 and 251 (n. 31).
208 On this issue, the report states the following: “A system of food rationing and an increase in agricultural pro-
duction made it possible to decently feed (sic) the population living in Switzerland”. During the televised debate
mentioned above (Droit de cité on 12/12/1999) the Commission’s president however said, and I quote: “We were
hungry, I remember it well”. See also my book, pp. 69, 95, 99-100, 151-3, 153 (n. 106), 155.
209 See my book, pp. 69-72, including note 174.57
cisely because it responded to so many other factors. As I see it, the total number of admitted
refugees would have been more or less the same.
Comparisons across countries often help to verify the findings of a counter-factual experiment.
Thus, the government of Great Britain, where anti-Semitism was rather weak at that time, fol-
lowed a hard line against Jewish refugees trying to emigrate to Palestine, which was then un-
der British mandate.
210 This was due not so much to anti-Semitism as above all to the British
authorities’ desire to avoid a more or less massive Jewish immigration, which would have
caused problems with, or a new revolt from the Arab population, and would have made the
management of the British mandate even more difficult.
211
What is disturbing in the report is not so much its thesis that anti-Semitism was the driving
force of Swiss official line toward foreigners in general and refugees in particular but that it
presents this thesis as an established fact without attempting to substantiate it in a counter-
factual manner.
Where the report delves into cheap sociology
Continuing with the topic of anti-Semitism, the report makes the following statements that
warrant commentary:
Jewish presence in influential spheres [in Switzerland] was limited to a handful of people,
none of whom held a government post or worked in the upper echelons of the [Federal] ad-
ministration.
215 This anti-Semitism was mostly unspoken and kept below the surface, but was
deeply ingrained in the social fabric, and the cause for the social, economic, and political
marginalisation of the small Swiss Jewish minority. It led to under-representation of Jews in
the administration, economic organisations and the military.
216
At the time, Switzerland’s Jewish community numbered at most 20,000 people.
217 With a total
population of 4-4 ½ million in those years, this represented 0.5% or a little less: five people in
one thousand. Did the Commission attempt to verify if this “handful” of Jews “in the admini-
stration, economic organisations and the military” constituted a smaller percentage than that of
the Jewish community to the entire population?
As for the fact that there was no Jew in the seven-member Federal government, it is difficult to
see, considering the circumstances, why this should be extraordinary or necessarily discrimi-
natory.
219
                        
210 See above the documents that Rothmund had had prepared on this subject.
211 As one knows, the British finally threw in the towel in 1947-49. This was largely due to the fact that Palestine
had become uncontrollable for an exhausted Great Britain, that is barring drastic and unpalatable measures.
215 Pp. 88-9.
216 P. 276.
217 Approximately 18,000 is the number generally given for the Jewish community in Switzerland at that time.
Many of them did not hold Swiss citizenship, which is significant in this respect (positions in the governments or
upper echelons of the administration, for example, could only be held by Swiss citizens).
219 If we assume that the membership in the Federal government changed completely every four years at election
time, and if we insist upon a strictly proportional representation of the Jewish community, there would have been
the probability of one Jew in the government every 114 years. With only partial change in the Federal Council, this
probability would have been even lower.58
In fact, how many people were there in the “upper echelons of the [Federal] administration”,
which was then much smaller than today? If there were less than one hundred people in these
upper echelons, the probability of having one Jew among them was practically nonexistant.
220
In addition, it seems that despite the low numbers of the Jewish community, there were several
Jewish general officers in the army.
221
Finally, the Jewish community was not absent or even under-represented in the economy. It is
a fact, completely coincidental, that several large department stores of the time belonged to
Jews.
222 As these establishments created unwelcome competition
223 for the numerous, and
politically powerful, smaller shops and their complementary activities (artisans), the strong
Jewish presence in the sector of department stores was highly visible at the time. Or perhaps, it
was made visible by, among others, a few small fascist-leaning groups desperate for voters.
This probably added to the latent and diffused anti-Semitism, without of course justifying it in
any sense.
In general, these pseudo-sociological comments from the Commission on the supposed exclu-
sion or under-representation of Jews are examples of what German-speakers would call
Quota-Denken (i.e. all groups in society have to be represented proportionately in the admini-
stration, the economy, etc.) In any case, it is difficult to understand why these comments ap-
pear in a report dedicated to Swiss refugee policy during World War II. Is the Commission
trying to prove too much, once again? 
224
3.6  “Impossible to compare... but Sweden was better!”
In its introduction and further along in its text, the report states the following:
The complex nature of the source material did not permit a systematic comparison of Swiss
refugee policy with that of other countries, since it would have gone beyond the scope of this
report
225 (…) Only a meticulous, comparative study would allow us to establish with preci-
sion each nation’s merits and deficiencies.
226
Unless I am mistaken, these are the only two instances where the report justifies its refusal of
the international comparative perspective. However, the press release is much more explicit –
and lengthy – in this matter: 
227
                        
220 The proportion of five Jews to one thousand corresponds to 0.5 Jew in one hundred people. With less than one
hundred people in the federal government, this figure would drop to less than 0.5, which must be rounded down to
zero, given that a human being cannot be divided in two.
221 Thus, the chief warrant officer of the army (Superintendent Dollfus) and one of the Corps leaders (Constam)
were apparently Jewish, see my book, p. 43, n. 12, including the sources. However, Henry Spira has expressed
serious doubts about the first case and maintains that the second person was a convert to Protestantism.
222 Such as Innovation and EPA/Uniprix; but by no means all, for example: Jelmoli, Globus or Grieder.
223 As did, for example, Migros.
224 I will not insult them by suggesting that they are favourable to an overrepresentation of Jews in the given areas.
225 P. 10.
226 P. 42.
227 P. 3 of the French version, with some extra passages taken from the English version.59
Already before this report had been published, critical voices could be heard to the effect that
we have not taken into consideration the international aspects of the issue. This reproach is
unfounded. The point here is not to confuse two different things, namely the question of the
analysis taking account of the international context at the time, on the one hand, and that of
comparability on the international level, on the other.
The international context [underlined in the original] is omnipresent in the report. How could
it be otherwise? In both of the introductory chapters, we recall the escalating German policy
of aggression following Hitler’s assumption of power. We depict the failure of the interna-
tional community with respect both to German power politics and to the refugees, as shown
by the failure at Evian in 1938. We distinguish between the first half of the war, with Nazi
Germany marching from victory to victory and simultaneously shifting from a policy of ex-
pulsion to one of extermination, and the second half with the Allied victory in sight. Thus, the
international context is indeed systematically taken into account and the specific role of Swit-
zerland examined within the international setting. Switzerland’s specificity lay in its neutral-
ity and in the humanitarian and diplomatic tasks incumbent thereupon [this last affirmation –
the link between neutrality and humanitarian duties – is anachronistic
228], its tradition as a
land of asylum, its role as a financial centre, and, from 1942 on, its increasing isolation.
Now, as to comparing [underlined in the original]: it goes without saying that the Commission
did debate the question of whether or not it was possible to compare Swiss policy with that of
other countries, for instance, with that of Spain, Sweden, or the United States. It decided not
to do so for two reasons. On the one hand, an authoritative comparison going beyond a mere
juxtaposition of figures is scarcely possible given the considerable differences in the degree to
which the various countries have carried out research on the topic, not to mention the quality
of the figures available on the acceptance or rejection of refugees. And, on the other hand,
there are significant dissimilarities when we consider the geographical realities as well as the
military, political, and economic situations of the individual countries at specific points in
time. Had a comparison been undertaken, an overwhelming number of heterogeneous vari-
ables would have had to be taken into consideration, and it is doubtful that if we take the
summer of 1942 for instance, there was any other country whose situation could be deemed
comparable to that of Switzerland.
An initial question
One question to begin with: how can it be possible to integrate an “omnipresent” international
context into the report while leaving out the asylum policies of other states
229, and especially
their probable diversity? This latter aspect was essential for the refugees attempting to escape
Nazism (were admittance policies of all countries equally restrictive or were some more leni-
ent than others?) These same refugees are however supposed to be at the heart of the Commis-
sion’s report.
Swiss policy was not developed in a vacuum
                        
228 The doctrine of neutrality as it was understood at the time did not include any humanitarian obligations, from a
legal or moral perspective. This came much later, after the war (conceptions of “active neutrality” and “neutrality
and solidarity”).
229 The report explicitly points out the necessity to do so, as the above quote includes the following sentence:  “A
clear distinction is drawn between the various phases of refugee policy, i.e., before the war broke out and against
the backdrop of the democratic states’ failure in Evian.”60
As demonstrated above, the refugee policies of other countries, that of the United States for
example, affected Swiss policy, which is the subject matter of the report. If only for this rea-
son, it is difficult to understand how Swiss policy could be analysed without taking into con-
sideration policies in other countries. However, determining the nature and probable diversity
of national policies obviously requires comparison between them. On this point, the report’s
logic is confounding.
The moral angle
The probable diversity of national policies becomes extremely important if the objective is not
only to describe and analyse Swiss policy, but also to judge it (despite Marc Bloch’s and Fer-
nand Braudel’s urgent warnings). If all countries, Switzerland included, were restrictive to
exactly the same degree, Switzerland might still be judged and condemned on the basis of
some universal and absolute moral standards. It would then be difficult, however, not to judge
or condemn all the others as well, at least implicitly.
Suppose now that Swiss policy were to turn out to have been – in practice if not in “theory” –
significantly less restrictive than that of most other states, as at least one specialist in the field
has concluded:
It is undeniable that in terms of admitting [Jewish] refugees Switzerland was, considering its
small size, more generous than any other country, except for Palestine.
230
Even then, it would be again possible to judge and condemn Switzerland according to the
commandments of some absolute morality (“It did more than others, but not enough”), but it
would be somewhat awkward to do so in abstracto without examining the standards and the
various other practices at that time.
However, in practice...
There is also the Commission’s “practical” argument: to compare national refugee policies
would have been “complex” and would have required a “meticulous study”, not to mention the
uneven “quality of figures available on the acceptance or rejection of refugees for the con-
cerned countries – Sweden, Spain, or the United States, for example.”
The quality of these figures is indeed uneven. For example, ample research is available for the
United States and Canada, whose refugee policies and practices have been the subject of nu-
merous studies, usually highly critical and severe.
232 However, we have less or much less in-
formation for other countries (Sweden, the Iberian Peninsula, the countries of Central and
South America, Palestine, etc.) Yet, a recent discussion on the case of Sweden in the pages of
the NZZ, the leading Swiss daily, demonstrated that there is a substantial number of studies
and sources on the Swedish case, to which I will return.
                        
230 David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941 – 1945, New York, Pantheon
Books, 1987; p.301. Note however that some other parts of Wyman’s analysis have lately come under strong attack
by – among others – Peter Novick.
232 See the following footnote.61
A comparative analysis of the principal national policies, complete enough to allow for a satis-
factory overview, could have been carried out without excessive expenditure of time and
money if the Commission had really wanted to. It is well known that the Commission’s budget
was 22-24 million francs (around 15 million US$), an unprecedented sum for historical re-
search, at least in Switzerland. In my opinion, using a part of the enormous resources available
to the Commission for this task would have been a far better investment than the money spent
on the aforementioned annexed report, Switzerland and the German Ransom Demands in Oc-
cupied Holland. Although interesting, this study is of secondary importance to the report’s
objectives, as the Commission has acknowledged. In any case, it is much less useful than a
comparative, possibly outsourced study of various national refugee policies would have been.
Such a study would not have had to start from scratch, as there is a fairly large extant body of
writing on the refugee policies of various states during World War II.
233 Moreover, several
works in this field contain elementary, and sometimes more developed, forms of comparative
international analysis, for example the above-cited books by D. Wyman, M.-A. Charguéraud
and J.-J. Langendorf. By using these existing comparative elements and consulting the litera-
ture on various national policies, a single efficient researcher would certainly have been able to
draft a useful and relatively complete comparative study in a few months, without the need for
long and costly archival research.
Methodological obstacles?
Finally, we have the methodological obstacles, which the report’s press release describes in the
following passage (repeated from above):
There are significant dissimilarities when we consider the geographical realities as well as the
military, political, and economic situations of the individual countries at specific points in
time. Had a comparison been undertaken, an overwhelming number of heterogeneous vari-
ables would have had to be taken into consideration, and it is doubtful that if we take the
summer of 1942 for instance, there was any other country whose situation could be deemed
comparable to that of Switzerland.
This line of reasoning is really quite surprising. As a matter of fact, modern social sciences,
history not excepted, essentially aim at making different situations comparable.
235 What is the
interest or utility of analysis if we must limit ourselves to cases and circumstances that are
completely, or practically identical?  Below, I will demonstrate how it is possible, even now,
to make rough comparisons between Swiss and Swedish policies while taking into account
their differences in situation and context.
Even so ….
                        
233 For references, see my book, p. 47 (n. 2) and p. 50 (n. 14).
235 Suppose that, in the approach used in economics and econometrics, we wanted to compare a given variable (Y)
in two different economies, A and B; this variable could be, for example, the budgetary deficit in the two countries.
We would do so by comparing YA  and YB after “controlling” for the various variables, XA1, XA2,…, and XB1,
XB2,…, which affect YA  and YB. An example of an X variable could be a different economic situation in the two
countries. By “controlling” for this and other X’s, we can thus calculate and compare, in a valid manner, the
“structural deficit” in the two countries, as the O.E.C.D. actually does on a regular basis. This methodological point
is really elementary.62
Even while refusing, in principle, all comparative analysis, the report often stumbles into par-
allels between national policies. For example, consider what we find in one passage
alone (italics  mine):
Even after they were informed about the unbelievably cruel events taking place on a large
scale, the [ Swiss]  Federal authorities – like the governments of most other states – made few
changes in their policies regarding refugees. Most frequently, the Neutrals demonstrated in-
difference and passivity or attempted to find accommodations with the Nazi regime. Thus, in
both 1938 and 1942 Switzerland was able to use the actions of other democratic states as an
argument to justify closing its borders.
236
If the report contains frequent comparisons like these, someone obviously must have found
them to be necessary. Why then not carry this comparative process through to a systematic, or
more systematic, analysis?
Sometimes misleading comparisons
What is more, the comparisons found throughout the report are sometimes misleading, for
example: 
237
As far as [ pre-war]  international agreements and certain initiatives on behalf of refugees from
Germany were concerned (…), countries like Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Nor-
way proved to be less timid than Switzerland, even though the Swiss “admission rate” was
comparable to that of Belgium, for example. [ At this point, the following footnote is inserted.]
In summer 1939, the director of the “Council for German Jewry” (London) put the number of
Jewish refugees at 12,000 for Belgium, 10,000 for Switzerland, and 5,000 for the Scandina-
vian countries (source: Ludwig, 1957, p. 144)
According to these figures, which the report apparently accepts, Switzerland admitted immedi-
ately before the war twice as many refugees (10,000) than all of the Scandinavian countries
combined (5,000). Was Switzerland consequently more “timid” than Norway or Denmark?
Moreover, Switzerland, with a population of 4.192 million in 1938, granted asylum to 10,000
Jewish refugees, which means an admission rate of 24 refugees for 10,000 inhabitants. This
rate is close to double that of Belgium: with 8.374 million inhabitants and 12,000 Jewish refu-
gees, the Belgian admission rate was 14 Jewish refugees for 10,000 inhabitants.
238 It is really
difficult to comprehend why the author(s) of this passage did not figure out this simple arithm-
etic.
The most surprising aspect
However, the most surprising instance of this alleged rejection of any international comparison
transpired at the press conference where the report was presented to the public and media. On
                        
236 P. 277; other international comparisons appear on pp. 76, 81, 83, 102 (n. 5), 103 and 140.
237 P. 42; italics mine.
238 For population figures in 1938 see: Annuaire statistique suisse, 1954, p. 538. A footnote on page 42 of the
report cites the number of  “20,000 refugees admitted in six years” by Holland. In relation to the Dutch population
in 1938 (8,433 million), this means an admission rate of 24 Jewish refugees for 10,000 inhabitants, i.e. exactly the
same rate as in Switzerland.63
this occasion, Saul Friedländer, an eminent foreign member of the Commission and signatory
of the report, ventured into a set of comparisons between Switzerland and Sweden. According
to one newspaper, he stated that:
Sweden [ unlike Switzerland]  admitted Jews from everywhere.
239
In an interview with another daily paper, Mr. Friedländer said the following:
The [Swiss] people remained passive. This attitude was widely shared throughout Europe.
However, the Swedish case proves that attitudes could change. While its people were just as
anti-Semitic [?], perhaps even more so, Sweden changed its mind when it learned of the real-
ity of the concentration [extermination?]
240 camps in the summer of 1942. From that time on,
the country admitted Jews from Norway, Denmark and elsewhere. This is extraordinary (…)
Even though it no longer made military sense by then, the Swedes still feared a German inva-
sion as late as 1944. They nevertheless followed a policy favourable to the refugees.
241
That very same evening, on the news show of the French-language Swiss television, Mr.
Friedländer uttered phrases such as, “You did much less than the Swedes” – “you” obviously
meaning the entire Swiss people, then and today. The following are similar excerpts from the
aforementioned interview:
When you were in a position to help people who were threatened with death, and you did
nothing in full knowledge of the situation, you stopped being passive witnesses and went over
to a certain degree of acceptance.
Sweden
So, what about the case of Sweden? What follows is some material I have been able to find on
the subject in sundry sources,
242 but not an in-depth study based on extensive research.
Before the war, Sweden saw itself as a transit country, in much the same way as Switzerland.
Similarly, funding for refugee programs had to be private (see below). Toward the end of the
1930s, Sweden, just as Switzerland, did not consider Jews to be political refugees. After the
annexation of Austria, it likewise instituted a visa requirement for bearers of Austrian pass-
ports. Soon afterward, in the summer of 1938, almost at the same time as Bern, Stockholm
began negotiations with the Reich, and with the same objective: avoid a visa requirement for
all holders of German passports. In the end Sweden adopted the same system as Switzerland,
meaning that Rothmund was quicker. On October 27, 1938, the Swedish Foreign Office
adopted an official directive making the “J” stamp part and parcel of Swedish immigration
policy too.
                        
239 See the January 4, 2000, issue of the NZZ, which cites the Tagesanzeiger. I added the italics for reasons that will
be obvious further on in the text.
240 The existence of concentration camps (KZ in German) was widely known long before the war, in contrast with
the extermination camps.
241 Le Temps, December 11, 1999. Italics mine.
242 I base my study on the aforementioned works of D. Wyman, M.-A. Charguéraud and J.-J. Langendorf, as well as
on a well-researched article by Felix Müller on Swedish refugee policy (NZZ, 1/4/2000) and two letters to the
editor from the same newspaper (from the 12/28/1999 issue, signed M.U. Balsiger and the 1/11/2000 issue signed
Georg Kreis, Commission member and signatory of the report).64
Then, in the fall of 1941, the Swedish government decided to extend the statute of ‘political
refugees’ to all Jews. At the end of 1942, in reaction to the deportation of Jews in occupied
Norway,
243 the Swedish borders were generally opened to refugees. For practical reasons (in-
terdiction for the remaining German Jews to leave the Reich, the near impossibility of crossing
Europe in order to reach Sweden), this opening however had practically no effect. Indeed, an
official Swedish report
244 states “only a very small number of refugees from the European
continent could take advantage of this change in Swedish refugee policy”. Those refugees that
did enter Sweden included a few hundred Norwegian Jews at the end of 1942 and, in October
1943, almost the entire Jewish community of Denmark (approximately 7,000 people). Finally,
in the beginning of 1945, a few [Jewish?]  refugees from the Baltic states managed to reach the
Swedish shore.
More data on Sweden
The scattered numbers and statistics one can find on the Swedish case are not always consis-
tent. This is probably due to the same reasons that were characteristic of the Swiss case until
recently: the different sub-periods were not always distinguished clearly as was the case  for
the different categories and statutes of refugees. According to a credible newspaper report,
245
Sweden accepted from 1933 to 1939 approximately 4,000 asylum candidates, the majority of
whom were not Jewish. In the same period, Switzerland accepted 10,000 refugees, 6,600 of
whom were Jewish.
246 The same report points out that, due to its geographical location, only
Scandinavian Jews sought asylum in Sweden.
According to the more global figures in this report, Sweden admitted approximately 187,000
refugees from 1933 to 1945, including 50,000 Danes and Norwegians as well as 70,000 Fin-
nish children. Switzerland admitted a total of 295,000, including 104,000 military personnel
and 60,000 children. 20,000 of the refugees in Sweden were Jewish compared to 29,000 in
Switzerland; this means a practically identical percentage (around 10%).
However, David Wyman contends that Sweden only admitted 12,000 Jews toward the end of
the war, including 8,000 from Denmark, 1,000 from Norway and 3,000 who came from Cen-
tral Europe before the war. Obviously, the statistics on Sweden need to be clarified and re-
fined. It would have been helpful if the report had tried to do so.
Swedish and Swiss policies
Until the end of 1941, Sweden’s policy and practice were harsher and more restrictive than
those of Switzerland. After that date, striking parallels developed between the two countries,
with a certain time lag. Sweden’s relaxation of its restrictive stance at the end of 1941 corre-
sponds to the official liberalisation in Switzerland in the fall of 1943. Sweden’s generalised
                        
243 See supra, table 5.
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245 F. Müller, op.cit.
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opening of its borders at the end of 1942 calls to mind that of Switzerland in July 1944. Paul
A. Levine maintains in this book
247 that Sweden’s shift in the second half of the war was mo-
tivated by a desire to have the Allies forget or forgive the country’s attitude at the start of the
conflict.
248
In reality, a very small number
One thing that should be retained from all of this is that when Saul Friedländer speaks (above)
of Jewish refugees arriving in Sweden from “elsewhere [than Norway and Denmark]”, or
“coming from everywhere”, his remarks are misleading. The majority of refugees in Sweden
actually came from Scandinavia; Jews from elsewhere accounted for only a very small num-
ber. It could not have been any different. A quick glance at a map of Europe is proof enough:
cut off from the continent by the Baltic and the Danish straits, Sweden was for all intents and
purposes a far-off island, the access to which was particularly difficult in wartime. Sweden
was surely much more difficult to reach than a Switzerland situated at the very centre of the
continent.
249
Allowing for differences by “controlling for them”
In these objective circumstances (and geography is after all undeniably objective), which were
obviously known to the Swedish authorities, it was easier for Sweden to adopt liberal princi-
ples and to enact – more or less opportunistic – shifts in policy earlier than Switzerland. But,
how would Sweden have reacted if it had been faced with an influx of refugees the size of that
actually encountered by Switzerland, or if it had had to take into account the potentially mas-
sive migration of refugees that would have occurred if Swiss policy had been different (see
above)?
By neglecting the differences in the context of the two countries – or, in scientific language, by
not “controlling for” these variables – Mr. Friedländer unfortunately stumbled into exactly the
sort of superficial comparisons the report uses as an excuse to justify its avoidance of any and
all international comparisons. In my opinion, this is rather ironic and sad.
Denmark
The case of Denmark also deserves our attention.
250 In reality, it is much less exemplary than
generally alleged. During the war, the Danes did save almost all “their own” Jews, a small
community of six to eight thousand, by ferrying them to Sweden when the German occupying
forces wanted to arrest them. Before the war, however, Denmark did not demonstrate any more
                        
247 From Indifference to Activism, Upsala, 1996.
248 “And it succeeded in doing so”, concludes Felix Müller in his NZZ article.
249 One should remember that Switzerland is not entirely surrounded by an impenetrable wall of mountains, since in
particular Geneva and Ticino are and were completely accessible. In that respect, there is and was also a significant
difference between the (low) Jura mountains in the west and the (high) Alps in the south and east, particularly
insofar as the Ajoie region is concerned, its being located on the French side of the Jura range.
250 The rest of this paragraph and the following are taken from my book, op.cit, pp. 75-6.66
generosity than other countries when it came to admitting foreign Jewish refugees. One histo-
rian
251 mentions the figure of 1,500 Jewish refugees who were admitted by Denmark before
1940 (compared to 8-10,000 by Switzerland) for a population (3.7 million), which was only
slightly lower than that of Switzerland.
It should be noted that Denmark is, like Switzerland, an immediate neighbour of Germany and
therefore was more accessible to German refugees than other, more distant lands. As for sav-
ing Danish Jews during the war, one could argue that by escaping invasion (for various reasons
which we cannot go into here
252), Switzerland assured the survival not only of the entire Swiss
Jewish community of some 20,000 people, but also of about the same number of foreign Jew-
ish refugees who had found asylum on its territory, making for a total of about 40,000 Jews
who did not fall into Nazi hands.
Another justification?
In the course of a televised debate that was mentioned earlier, the president of the Commission
presented still another argument to justify its refusal of an international comparative dimen-
sion: this dimension was not part of the mandate conferred upon the Commission by the Par-
liament and the Federal Council. I will demonstrate below, in a “legal parenthesis”, that this
mandate was actually interpreted in a very elastic manner. Therefore, it could have been the
same for the international comparative dimension. Moreover, and even if it would have meant
interpreting its mandate loosely, the Commission would have been forgiven: as we know, the
reaction from the Federal Council following the publication of the report clearly deplored the
lack of an international comparative perspective.
To conclude, I cannot help suspect, at least until proven wrong, that the reason the report does
not compare the different national refugee policies is that this endeavour would have risked
exonerating Switzerland.
3.7 A legal parenthesis: the Commission’s mandate
253
The report’s introduction describes the mandate conferred upon the Commission by a decree
of the Federal Council dated December 19, 1996, a mandate which is quoted as
(...) demanding [ sic]  in its art. 2.1.2 that the Commission investigate the “importance of the
policy toward refugees in as much as it is related to the economic and financial relations of
Switzerland with the Axis powers and the Allies»; see: Sarasin/Wacker, Raubgold, 1998, p.
164.
254
Intrigued to see a private work cited as a source for a decree of the Federal Council, I decided
to investigate further. Moreover, I had the privilege of testifying before the Legal Affairs
Commission of the Swiss Lower House on April 27, 1999, in the course of a hearing concern-
                        
251 Langendorf, op.cit., p. 60 ; see also Charguéraud, op.cit., pp. 179 and 211-2, which mentions the number of
1,351 Jewish refugees admitted into Denmark.
252 See chapter 10 of my book, op.cit.
253 I would like to thank Mr. Simon Hotte for his help on this “legal parenthesis”. Mr. Hotte is one of my assistants
who is currently working on his thesis in international law.
254 P. 9 of the report.67
ing the first Bergier report. On this occasion, and also following several private conversations,
I came to feel that the origins and the nature of the Commission’s mandate were far from clear.
The legal sources I consulted thereupon
255 clearly establish that this mandate concerns above
all, if not exclusively, “the fate of assets that arrived in Switzerland following the rise of the
Nazi regime”.
256 In other words, the Commissions research should have concentrated on the
problem of dormant funds as its principal, if not unique, objective.
It is however true that the Federal Council’s order of December 19, 1996, which was not pub-
lished as such but is available on the Commission’s web site, explains – in a single sentence of
an otherwise lengthy text – that one of the issues that the Commission could examine was “the
significance of refugee policy in as much as it is related to Switzerland’s economic and finan-
cial transactions with the Axis and Allied powers”.
257 Moreover, the Federal decree of Decem-
ber 13, 1999, states (art. 1.3) that “following an eventual proposal by the experts [ of the Com-
mission] , or of its own initiative, the Federal Council has the power to modify the area of re-
search in order to take account of new elements or the work done by other [ i.e. foreign]  re-
search bodies”.
258
Dealing, as it does almost exclusively, with refugee policy considered per se, the second Ber-
gier report has obviously overstepped the field of investigation assigned to the Commission as
per these various legal decisions. This is not to suggest that in doing so the Commission actu-
ally broke the law, because it is possible that the decision to proceed with a general study of
refugee policy was made with the consent of the Federal Council.
259 On that particular point,
however, the Commission’s initial mandate was certainly interpreted loosely, or redefined very
broadly. Yet, as we saw above, this interpretation or redefinition did not go so far as to include
the international comparative dimension because, according to the president of the Commis-
sion, it would have been contrary to its mandate…
Nevertheless, these legal constraints must be the reason for the rather long chapter in the report
on Financial and property considerations [as supposedly related to the refugee issue].
260 For
some readers, such as myself, this chapter seems to be a foreign body in the report. Beyond a
                        
255 (1) The Federal Council opinion, dated September 16, 1996, on the parliamentary initiative proposing a Federal
decree concerning legal and historical research on the fate of assets deposited in Switzerland as a result of the Nazi
regime (RO 1996 - 549, ad 96.434, pp. 1190-5); (2) The Federal decree dated December 13, 1996 (RO 1996, pp.
3487-9), and (3) its initial draft (Feuille fédérale, 148
th year, no. IV, pp. 1197-9); (4) The Federal Council decree
of December 19, 1996 (the source is indicated in the text).
256 To quote the title of the key text of September 16, 1996.
257 Italics and translation (from the original German) mine.
258 Italics supplied.
259 The Commission obviously works independently, but that does not mean that it is entitled to redefine its man-
date on its own initiative and as it wishes. Recently, it has come to my ears that, following an emotional discussion,
the Federal Council did agree to a general study of refugee policy. The question therefore becomes whether it was
rightfully entitled to decide such a far-reaching redefinition of the Commission’s mandate without prior consulta-
tion of the Parliament. Indeed, there were no “new elements” I can see, and no new “work done by other research
bodies”, to justify extending or redefining the Commission’s mandate. I am no legal expert, but all this seems more
than a little “fishy”.
260 Pp. 183-247.68
few interesting but secondary and extraneous details, I found nothing new in it, which is why I
will limit myself to just one or two critical commentaries.
Thus, one reads: 
261
The Federal government relied on the Swiss Jewish community for financial assistance to the
community’s needy members. Such a practice seems more than a little questionable, consid-
ering the principle of equal rights for all.
This is anachronistic.
262 At that time, the Swiss “welfare state” was in its embryonic stage and
consensus in the social field was very different from what it is today. It was widely accepted
that everything should be done to prevent anyone, not just refugees, from becoming dependent
on society at large. Whenever there was one or more private guarantors, social aid was consid-
ered to be their duty and responsibility: “Protestants take care of Protestants, Catholics of
Catholics, and Jews of Jews” – such was the consensus at the time, in Switzerland as well as
elsewhere.
263 Therefore to speak of “equal rights” in this context is simply not appropriate.
Still in the general financial area, the report states the following in another chapter: 
264
In 1947, one could read [ in a report by the Federal Council]  that the Swiss Confederation rep-
resented a safe-haven during the world conflict:
“In the midst of a Europe in turmoil, Switzerland became a land where every individ-
ual sought asylum for his person and for his property.”
While acknowledging that Switzerland as a financial centre underwent a decisive phase in its
development [in the 1930s? and/or during the war? or because of it?], this retrospective view
ignores the discriminatory criteria that were applied depending on whether property or per-
sons were involved. The influx of European capital took place with practically no obstacles,
whereas the border was often hermetically sealed [!] against persons in need of asylum.
The assertion about a “decisive phase in the development” of Switzerland as a financial centre
that allegedly took place in the 1930s and/or during the war is contrary to well-know facts and
thus constitutes one more myth. Banking statistics demonstrate that the consolidated balance
sheet and hence the global assets and liabilities of Swiss banks were slightly lower in 1945
than in 1930 when measured in nominal terms, i.e. in current francs. Taking into consideration
the increase in prices between 1930 and 1945, there was a drop of no less than 25% in real
terms. The development of Switzerland as a major, or at least significant, financial centre actu-
ally experienced its “decisive phases” in the second half of the nineteenth century (up to 1914),
                        
261 P. 192.
262 For more details, see my book, p.77 (“Financing the refugees” ).
263 As the report recognises (top of page 205). Also note the following sentence (same page, n.155, italics sup-
plied): “It was not until the summer of 1942 that Protestant aid programs for refugees provided financial support to
Jewish refugees”. The “until” is quite shocking. In fact, as we saw above, it was exactly in the summer of 1942 that
the influx of Jewish refugees began. Or again: “The vehemence with which the Confederation refused any financial
responsibility until the end of the war, etc.” This statement is in stark contradiction with André Lasserre’s finding in
regard to the Confederation’s financial involvement (op.cit., p. 78 ; see also my book, p. 77).
264 P. 53. Italics mine.69
in the 1920s, and most especially after World War II. In the 1930s and during the war, it first
stagnated and then declined.
265
3.8  Miscellaneous
The present critical evaluation of the extremely bulky Bergier report (more than 800 pages
with the annexed studies) cannot possibly be exhaustive, or it would have to be much longer.
Among the other aspects of the report that deserve investigation, I will therefore limit myself
to the three issues.
“They knew”
On several occasions, the report insists upon the fact that Swiss leaders and authorities were
aware of the horrible events, the Holocaust in particular, taking place in Nazi-controlled
Europe.
266
In this respect, the report takes precautions by mentioning: (1) the genuine problem of sorting
out pertinent information from the mass of reports and other information arriving in Bern or
elsewhere in Switzerland; top priority was of course given to issues dealing with Switzerland’s
own survival, given that the country could hardly control the world-wide conflict; (2) the
credibility of much of this information on account of the experiences from the First World
War, which had not been forgotten (the Allies’ “atrocities propaganda” or Greuelpropaganda).
However, in the rest of the report, these preliminary precautions are forgotten, as demonstrated
in the following citations, to make way for abusive assertions (italics) or generalisations (un-
derlined):
In August 1942, facts about the systematic extermination [ of Jews]  were not yet widely
known; but for those involved in asylum policy [consequently, all authorities and leaders such
as Rothmund] there was little doubt about the horrible fate awaiting the victims of deporta-
tion. It was in this context that the Federal authorities made decisions that were fraught with
consequences (...) The military had precise information as early as the beginning of 1942
about the massive scale of the massacres being perpetrated in Europe.
267 At the same time
[summer 1942], Swiss authorities were in possession of extensive and precise information [on
the Holocaust]. Despite this, they decided to close the border, to take in only a small number
of persecuted people (...)
268 Even after they were informed about the unimaginable events
taking place, the Federal authorities – like the governments of most other states – made few
changes in their policies regarding refugees.
269
In short, “they” knew everything; or more precisely, everyone knew everything.
                        
265 For more details, see my book, pp. 159 -160 and 202.




The main problem in this context is given short shrift in the preliminary precautions, through a
one-sentence-long paragraph, which uses a phrasing meant to minimise the issue (italics
mine):
270
A third filtering method was a result of a certain disbelief when faced with massacres on such
a massive scale, without precedent in human history.
271
Raoul Hilberg, a leading expert on the Holocaust, defined much better than I ever could this
principal problem, which the report all but ignores. At a conference in Zurich in 1997, he
stated that governments at the time simply could not bring themselves to believe that such an
attempt at extermination could take place “in Germany, in – of all places – that nation of cul-
ture”.
272
When Gertrud Katz – one of the Swiss “mothers of refugees” – came to beg Federal Council-
lor E. von Steiger, in August 1942 during his vacation on Mount Pélerin, not to close the fron-
tier to refugees, the head of the Department of Justice and Police responded by saying it was
unthinkable that the “country of Goethe” would want to kill millions of Jews.
273 Was this a
sincere expression of incredulity in reaction to such news, or the hypocritical excuse of some-
one ‘who knew’? Everyone can draw his or her own conclusions.
Geneva indicted
The report dedicates no less than seven pages to a detailed examination of “the practices used
in Geneva during the fall of 1942”,
274 adding a bit further that “this affair is of considerable
historical significance, as it typifies the most fundamental problems in [ Swiss]  asylum prac-
tice”.
Said sordid “affair” concerns some truly offensive acts against asylum candidates committed
by two civil servants, then stationed at the Geneva border, who will remain anonymous
here.
275 The principal instigator of these acts was arrested in October 1942 and sentenced to
three years in prison. In fact, the minutes of his trial provide the bulk of the information we
have on the crimes of these two guards (among how many others?).
                        
270 P. 88.
271 Without precedent? This is hardly certain considering for example the massacres perpetrated by Gengis Khan
and other Mongols, or closer to us, the Armenian massacre of 1915, or still more recently the horrors of China’s
cultural revolution, which resulted in nearly 30 million victims, etc. (Cf. my book, p. 75). The horrifying specificity
of the Holocaust was its industrial, cold organisation and its bureaucratically modern nature. Moreover, it is only
recently that the world has really become conscious of the moral implications of the Holocaust.
272 In Deutschland, ausgerechnet in der Kulturnation Deutschland. Cf. my book, p. 45, n. 19; and pp. 43-5.
273 Unless I am mistaken, the report does not mention this episode.
274 Pp. 144-51; italics mine.
275 Because it seems that one of the two is still living and has recently appeared on television, and they both may
have living children. By naming them, the report infringes on the moral, if not legal, rights of those who have paid
their debt to society, not to mention their right to a moral statute of limitations. In the United States, this would
probably have led to a federal trial, with high compensation claimed for damages. Even in Switzerland, one won-
ders if one of the two guards in question, who is apparently still alive and was not convicted (report p.151, n. 270),
could not file a defamation lawsuit due to the very negative and disrespectful remarks about him – see, among
others, pp. 150-1. Finally, it should be noted that the report is much more respectful in preserving the anonymity of
individual refugees, as it usually only gives first names and/or initials.71
The fact that there were a few other incidents of this nature has been established.
276 However,
they were not nearly representative. The report itself demonstrates this, as in the following
passage, already cited (italics mine):
(...) [In the last two weeks of August 1942] von Steiger informally told the Geneva authorities
that until the protests had died down, they were not to expel any Jewish refugees, and that no
one was to be turned over directly to the Germans. From then on, the Geneva authorities by and
large no longer applied the regulations of August 13, 1942.
However, this does not impede the report from stating the following in its conclusion: 
277
[The heartless, callous and violent behaviour of officials at the border] is documented by the
methods used in Geneva to expel refugees in the fall of 1942 (...) Conditions there cannot be
considered exceptional.
With the Jura and Ticino, Geneva was one of the most important entry points for refugees. As
shown above, refugees generally had high admittance chances. If all guards at this sector of the
frontier, or even most of them, acted like these two, how is it possible that so many were ad-
mitted in the summer-fall of 1942 and later? Moreover, it has been proven that certain groups
in Geneva, Protestants in particular, and a part of the population of this city were active in an
effective, long-lasting and admirable effort to help the refugees.
In cauda venenum
The final page of the report is entirely taken up by a section entitled “Two Questions” (sud-
denly counter-factual in nature) although it mainly offers a set of affirmations in response to
these two questions.
In the whole report, this page is the most visible and, at the time of publication, was certainly
read by a large part of the media who then had to report on the endeavour without having time
enough to read the full text or even to leaf through it.
The principal sentences of this final page, those that are most problematic, have already been
examined above, but at different points. In order to save space and time, I will not re-examine
them as a whole, even if such an analysis would underline one characteristic that the second
Bergier report has in common with its predecessor. To be specific, the two reports are like
sandwiches: in the centre one finds some often questionable analyses, but which by and large
maintain a scientific tone; the two edges, the introduction and conclusion, however consist of
two “slices” of definitive judgements, which are often not substantiated by the analyses found
in the centre. The second report is in fact a truncated sandwich, as the judgements are primar-
ily located in the conclusion and particularly on the last page.
Of all of the judgements, the following incited the most virulent criticisms (italics mine):
                        
276 See pp. 146-9.
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By creating additional barriers for [the refugees] to overcome, Swiss officials helped the Nazi
regime achieve its goals, whether intentionally or not.
The insertion of the phrase “intentionally or not” necessarily indicates that the report’s authors
did not exclude the possibility that the Swiss authorities acted in an intentional manner – in
other words, that they were active accomplices of the Nazis.
The day after the report’s publication, Saul Friedländer stated, in an interview cited above:
The report refers to an “intentional or otherwise contribution” on the part of Switzerland. To
be as fair as possible, I believe that “conscious or not» would be a better expression.
The nuance is thin, as the complicity becomes passive but is still present.
If the report’s conclusion absolutely had to express a judgement in this matter, and it is far
from obvious that it had to, the following phrasing would have been a little more diplomatic,
as well as more accurate: “and no matter that it was unintentional”. As it reads, however, a jury
would certainly find that, to the extent that no fault may be involved, there was at least ex-
treme negligence in the choice of words that call into question – intentionally or not… – the
honour and historical reputation of an entire country and an entire people.
278
4.  General conclusions on the report and a new model
     of Swiss policy and practice toward the refugees
 The historian depends on the other social sciences,
but it is an enriching dependence.
            F. Braudel, 1902-1985
279
                        
278 In a conversation following the aforementioned televised debate, the president of the Commission told me, “I
will grant you that this choice of words was unfortunate”.
279 Op.cit., p. 48. Fernand Braudel adds that the historian nevertheless occupies a “separate place”, which seems
obvious to me. There is no, or should be no, place for imperialism in the social sciences, even if several fellow73
The researcher’s ‘tool box’
In the spirit of the above quote, the following is a list of the technical tools and instruments, in
no particular order, that I had to borrow from various sciences (social or other) in order to
study the historical problem of “Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era»: 
280
-    the classic theory of probability, which is part of mathematics;
-    the signalling model, from game theory;
-    the notion of “credibility” as used in the analysis of economic policy;
-    Granger’s causality tests, taken from modern econometrics;
-    the notion and problem of “identification”, also borrowed from modern econometrics;
-    the so-called “counter-factual” approach, which comes from modern economic history;
-    notions taken from demography, such as push and pull factors in the study of migratory
     movements.
A new interpretation ….
Without these tools and instruments, it would not have been possible to construct and present a
general interpretation of the refugee issue. This interpretation may be complex at times, how-
ever I feel it is coherent and, at least in some parts, original.
281 The present study therefore
proposes a relatively new model of Switzerland’s policy and practice toward refugees; by
“model” I mean any collection of reasoned, consistent and verified propositions that do not
necessarily have to take the form of equations.
The principal traits of this model are summarised in the box on the following page, in as
compact a format and as succinctly as possible.
As the reader will notice, or may have already noticed, this model emphasises the numerous
parallels between Swiss refugee policy during the “Nazi era” and that of today. Today’s con-
text is, in general and fortunately, less dramatic; however, the problems, behaviours, mecha-
nisms, constraints, dilemmas and feasible choices are basically the same.
Major features of my model of Swiss policy and practice toward refugees
                                                                            
economists, too proud of the “sophisticated” tools of their field, sometimes have a tendency to succumb to it.
280 Some of these technical tools and instruments are only found in footnotes, which are of a more technical nature
than the body of the text.
281 It is of course possible that there are still other tools or theories that would have been helpful to this study, but
that I either am not familiar with or that I did not think of using.74
...which was verified as much as possible…
(1) The model rests on a fundamental distinction between the official policy line, on the one
hand, and the actual practice toward refugees, on the other.
(2) The publicly stated principles of the official policy line were both rigid and restrictive
throughout most of the war.
(3) The main objective, conscious or more instinctive, of this rigid and restrictive official line
was to send out deterring signals to the mass of potential refugees in Europe. To accept
each and every one would have been physically impossible, whether it was for permanent
immigration or more short-term shelter. Moreover, this official line was not conceived in a
vacuum, but was influenced by the restrictive policies and practices of other states.
(4) The actual practice toward refugees who actually arrived at the Swiss border was quite dif-
ferent from the official policy line. Average admittance chances were generally high not
only per attempt (roughly two chances in three), but even more so per person (with an esti-
mated average admission probability of around 85%). The border was never really closed,
not even during the few days in August 1942 that followed an official decision to that ef-
fect. Consequently, the estimated number of “definitive rejections” amounts to a few thou-
sands while more than 51,000 “illegal” civilian refugees were admitted, in addition to an
unfortunately unknown number of “legal” refugees (those with appropriate papers).
(5) Practice toward Jewish refugees was more generous and liberal than toward other refugees.
(6) Admittance chances varied greatly according to place and time, in part due to conscious
and accepted reasons, but also because of accidental or less conscious ones. These varia-
tions, in conjunction with other factors beyond the control of Switzerland (e.g. borders that
were sealed on the other side), had a deterring effect on the mass of potential refugees in
Europe, including numerous non-Jews and non-persecuted groups (the S.T.O. evaders, for
example).
(7) Among the conscious or more instinctive motivations for the official policy, there could be
the rational aim of enhancing the credibility of a hard and deterring line, which demanded
that a largely generous and liberal practice be nonetheless variable and thus unpredictable.
In any case, an unvaryingly liberal and generous admittance practice would have certainly
diminished the official line’s credibility, which in turn would have led to a massive and un-
controllable influx. A diffuse and latent, but shallow and non-aggressive anti-Semitism, the
distrust of the outside world (not necessarily unfounded at that time) as well as fears of an
eventual Überfremdung were not determining factors in this particular context.
(8) For reasons that were partly conscious and partly contingent, Switzerland opened its fron-
tiers the widest, also to Jewish refugees, at moments of strongest influx of refugees and
when pressure at the border was the greatest – therefore at the most critical junctures from a
humanitarian perspective – whereas a purely selfish attitude would have demanded that all
refugees be turned away at all times and all visa requests be refused.75
My model has been verified through the use all the information at my disposal, be it numerical
or non-numerical data (i.e. other “historical facts”). In this respect, I do not claim that the data
and known facts found in this work “prove” my model.
In a certain sense, one never “proves” anything in science. All that can be hoped for or asserted
is that a scientific theory
282 or model is not rejected by the data and facts we know; or, if one
prefers, that the model is compatible with the data and facts we know. However, that will only
be “until further findings to the contrary” or “until proven otherwise”. For it is always possible
that new data or previously unknown facts, or even data and facts missed or misinterpreted by
the researcher, will question any given model or theory. Therefore, if it is impossible to prove
a given model, it is often possible to reject, refute or disprove it.
With this in mind, I believe to have established that some of the central facts and essential data
analysed in the previous pages effectively reject the central interpretations proposed by the
Bergier report.
… but still an interpretation that is in no way a new “revealed truth”
With regard to my model, I however wish to remain prudent. At this point, I am confident of
having used all of the available information taken in large part from the report, which should
be applauded for the ample data it provides. I also maintain that these facts and data, coming
from the report, are compatible with my interpretations, or my model. However, it is com-
pletely possible that I have omitted facts or data that would invalidate my model, either be-
cause I overlooked them, I am unaware of them or simply did not recognise their meaning or
pertinence. I am eagerly awaiting reactions to this work in the context of a general debate, as
the Commission says it wishes; a debate which should remain scientific and restrained. This is
hoping that such a debate takes place of course, instead of either haughty silence or an uncon-
trollable free-for-all.
How historians sometimes work, and how they might work
On several occasions, I presented data, both numerical and other, that the report furnishes or
mentions but leaves largely unanalyzed.
284 The same goes for the analytic tools, enumerated
above, which were not used when they were evidently necessary. What are the reasons for
these obvious failings?
One possible explanation, which I put forth with no arrogant intentions and no attempts to
place an entire profession on trial, has to do with the training of many historians. There are of
course excellent historians today, in Switzerland and elsewhere, who are completely adept at
using analytic tools from modern social sciences when and where it is necessary.
                        
282 Of course, the word “theory” is not used here in the pejorative sense as described above.
284 In the first chapter of the report, there is a short section entitled “Figures and categories” (pp. 20-6). One has the
impression that its objective is to do away with the numerical data as quickly as possible so as to concentrate on
subjects considered to be more important, such as individual case histories and the principles of official policy.
However, if numbers are provided, they should be sufficiently analysed as well.76
To take a recent example, Niall Ferguson, a young British historian at Oxford, has just written
a quite provocative (in the best sense of the word) historical book entitled The Pity of War.
285
While this work contains a few counter-factual experiments and conclusions that may leave
the reader perplexed,
286 it also has a chapter on the inherently economic problem of the repa-
rations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, a topic I will return to below. An-
other example is the recent monumental book by David Kennedy, cited above, that examines
American history between the end of the First World War and the end of the Second World
War. In this context, the author could not ignore the economic situation in the United States in
general and the Great Depression in particular.
While a professional economist who reads both of these works could certainly question one or
two points of economic analysis, or regret that such-and-such a contribution from general eco-
nomics or from historical economic literature was not taken into consideration, he or she
would nonetheless conclude that these are outstanding works.
Scientific evaluation of the second Bergier report
Unfortunately, I had to be much less congratulatory about the first report by the Bergier Com-
mission (on the gold transactions), which deeply shocked the majority of professional econo-
mists who examined it. Neither can I applaud today the scientific merits of the second report as
I have to state once again that several central facts established throughout the present study, for
example the admittance chances for refugees, are clearly incompatible with the interpretations
and judgements found in the report.
If, from a scientific perspective, one attempts to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the
useful contributions of the report (of which they are a few, as we have seen) and, on the other
hand, its weaknesses, gaps and failings, the conclusion has to be that the endeavour is globally
deficient. In this respect, it is really quite astonishing to see the report making negative judge-
ments that are not substantiated by analysis. Moreover, if we consider its effects on the public,
and consequently on the honour and image of Switzerland, this deficit means the complete
failure of the whole undertaking.
287
In addition, the negative judgements in the report, which deeply shocked quite a number of
Swiss as well as former refugees who had been admitted into the country during the war,
288
could very well provoke adversary reactions that risk in the end to defeat the noblest ambitions
attributable to the Bergier Commission and those who created it: not necessarily to force a re-
examination of Switzerland’s past, but to encourage reflection, to develop consciences and
maybe to make the modern country a bit more humane when and if necessary.
                        
285 Basic Books, 1998, 563 pp.
286 For example, Niall Ferguson argues that England should not have entered the First World War.
287 Once again, I must state that my conclusion brings me no personal pleasure, however ... “judge not lest you be
judged”. Moreover, the report is more than a purely scientific undertaking; it is also an assessment of the historical
image and honour of an entire country and a people. This is why I am, or need to be, frank and direct in my criti-
cism, much more so than I would be in a scientific journal.
288 As numerous letters to the editor from former refugees have demonstrated. See also the 67 eyewitness accounts
collected by Ken Newman, op.cit.77
Waiting for the final report
All of this suggests that in order to “do” history today, one often must be trained in more than
just traditional history. Thus, when it comes to studying an issue that touches on essentially
economic questions, one should ideally be both a historian and an economist. There are in fact
several examples of this. To mention only two authors, both of them economists who also
“do” history, the recent and remarkable books by David Landes, on Europe’s role in the crea-
tion of the modern economic world,
289 and that of Barry Eichengreen on the monetary and
financial aspects of the Great Depression in the 1930s
290 impressed and even positively en-
chanted historians and economists alike, even if all did not necessarily agree on every point.
This is demonstrated by the very favourable critical reviews of these works, which were
unanimous as far as I know, at least for the latter.
291
Why do I insist on this point? Because the final report of the Bergier Commission is yet to
appear and one should never despair, even if the prognosis after the first two reports is hardly
encouraging.
“Truth will triumph in the end”
My model of Swiss refugee policy and practice certainly contrasts with today’s dominant per-
ceptions. Will this model someday become recognised, or even make itself heard, being in
competition with interpretations that are flatly contradicted by important and established facts?
Nothing could be less certain, especially when we consider how certain myths are perpetuated
in history even when confronted with solid counter-demonstrations. There are several exam-
ples of this phenomenon, but I will limit myself to just one, in the field of economics.
This example has to do with the reparations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.
At the beginning, there was a book by John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of
Peace (1919). This work, which sold by the tens of thousands from the day of its publication,
was extremely influential. It denounced the alleged unrealistic nature, from an economic per-
spective, of these “gigantic” reparations.
292 Its tenor is unquestionably pro-German and it con-
tributed its part to America’s increasing isolationism immediately following the armistice,
which led the United States to reject the Treaty of Versailles and refuse to enter into the mili-
tary alliance with France promised at Versailles. Because of this promise, France had agreed to
numerous concessions at the peace negotiations. The book also contributed to Woodrow Wil-
                        
289 The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, London, Little Brown, 1998, 650 pp.
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291 Landes’ work was in fact criticised by a few politically correct revisionists for its alleged “euro-centrism”. – I
should add that, in my opinion, it is no doubt easier for an economist, who is not a historian, to “do” history (eco-
nomic or otherwise, as long as it is not a very specialised topic such as historical archaeology) than for a “pure”
historian to do research or historical analysis on a subject with strong economic connotations. The non-historian
economist would of course have to keep abreast of pertinent facts and existing historical literature, but he or she
would already have a solid “tool box” at his or her disposal. – In regard to “pure” history, I cannot resist quoting
the immortal phrase from the historian Colin McEvedy in the introduction to the Penguin Atlas of Ancient History:
“History being a branch of biology, its ultimate expression should be mathematical”; cited by Paul Krugman, The
Accidental Theorist, Norton & Co., 1998, p.128.
292 It also introduced a classic problem into modern economic analysis, i.e. the so-called transfer problem.78
son’s electoral defeat in 1920 by depicting him as an idealistic and naïve leader who was
duped and manipulated by Clémenceau (the “tiger”) and Lloyd George (the “fox”). In the
longer term, it also played a role in England’s increased feelings of guilt toward Germany (and
distrust of France), which eventually resulted in the pacifism, and appeasement of the 1930s.
the consequences of which are well known.
Keynes’ economic (and historical) analyses were however more than questionable. Etienne
Mantoux first demonstrated this in his book, La Paix calomniée ou les conséquences écono-
miques de M. Keynes (1946), that unfortunately appeared too late to have any influence on the
circumstances described above. Recently, Niall Ferguson dedicated an entire chapter on this
subject in his already cited work. A recent re-reading of Keynes and Mantoux has once again
convinced me of the accuracy of Mantoux’ (and Ferguson’s) critical analysis.
However, in history text after history text, and in article after article, we find the same old bi-
ased and politically loaded interpretations that trace their roots to Keynes. Myths are often
stronger than reality and some are unfortunately quite long-lived. We cannot therefore exclude
the possibility of this occurring in the case of Switzerland’s policy and practice toward refu-
gees during the last war.
Moral judgements….
To conclude, we must ask if Swiss refugee policy and practice during the last world war de-
serve judgements as severe as those found in the report and disseminated by the media.
In more general terms, what judgement(s) should apply to this policy and this practice? As far
as I am concerned, I would prefer to heed the advice, cited earlier, of Marc Bloch (1886-
1944), one of the greatest historians, when he denounced “the obsession with judging, that
satanic enemy of the true social sciences”. Moral judgements are dependent on individual
scales of values, and thus should be left to personal discretion. But they are not the historians’
monopoly, be they appointed by the “Royal Court” or not. The “obsession with judging” of so
many of today’s historians however forces those who want to respond to them to follow the
same path, despite their hesitation.
This is why I will dare to conclude, in a normative manner, and say that the fact that Switzer-
land opened its borders widely to refugees does not necessarily exonerate the country. One
could easily accept the classic determination that “the country certainly did much, but it per-
haps could have done even more”. However, the one should not eclipse the other. Which is
more important for the final moral judgement, the lives that were in danger and were not
saved, but could have been; or the endangered lives that were saved, but could have been lost?
Or, should we perhaps understand that, in this field, lapses must necessarily always weigh
more heavily than merits?
Lausanne and Bougy-Villars, mid-December 1999 to March 2000